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DR. BOB SHELDON, FS, AND DR. YUNA
WONG, INTERVIEWERS
BOB SHELDON: We’re at the MORS
office for an oral history interview with Sy
Deitchman. First of all, when and where
were you born?
SEYMOUR DEITCHMAN: January
15, 1923 in New York City.
BOB SHELDON: What were your par-
ents’ names and how did they influence you
academically and professionally?
SEYMOUR DEITCHMAN: My fa-
ther’s name was Leo Deitchman. My mother
was Pauline Deitchman, maiden name Levy.
They came over as immigrants during the
late 1890s or early 1900s. The way they influ-
enced me was to instill not only a love of
learning, but a must about learning. ‘‘You’re
going to go to college. You’re going to be
a professional man. You’re not going to make
ladies’ pocketbooks like I do.’’ So that’s
where it all started.
BOB SHELDON: So that was your fa-
ther’s profession, making pocketbooks?
SEYMOUR DEITCHMAN: Yes. He
first made shoes and then he made pocket-
books. He was a small businessman. He
ran his own business.
BOB SHELDON: That was in New
York City?
SEYMOUR DEITCHMAN: And cities
near there, yes. Wherever he could find
work.
BOB SHELDON: Where did you go to
elementary school, junior high school, and
high school?
SEYMOUR DEITCHMAN: Could I
put in a caveat about memory?
BOB SHELDON: Okay.
SEYMOUR DEITCHMAN: I’ve
checked against the records wherever I
could so that I could remember what to tell
you. But memory is an evanescent thing I’m
finding, especially at my age, so be warned.
BOB SHELDON: Okay. We’ll remem-
ber that.
SEYMOUR DEITCHMAN: I went to
Stuyvesant High School in New York, which
is an engineering preparatory school. Now I
should note, I always wanted to be in avia-
tion, from the time I was nine years old. I
planned initially to spend two years at CCNY
[the City College of New York] because that
school was free at the time and engineering
courses pretty much started out the same
way at all colleges, with some humanities
and basic physics, math and mechanics, be-
fore they specialized in the various branches
of engineering. Then I had planned to take
a year off and go to work on a ship in the en-
gine room and travel a bit, and then come
back and go to NYU [New York University]
and study aeronautical engineering.
BOB SHELDON: Let me back up. At
nine years old, you said you got interested
in aviation. What happened?
SEYMOUR DEITCHMAN: That was
shortly after Lindbergh flew the Atlantic
and interested the country in aviation. That
was the trigger. I declared I wanted to be a pi-
lot, and my father said, ‘‘No. That’s too dan-
gerous.’’ So I said, ‘‘Okay. I’ll be an engineer,
and build them.’’ I had a much-admired uncle
who was a civil engineer, and helped build
the Triboro Bridge in New York. My father
thought that still would be too dangerous be-
cause I might have to fly. But he learned to live
with that. In fact, eventually I got him flying.
World War II intervened in my plan. So
I started at CCNY, and then it was one step
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I was determined to get my degree. I managed
to do what amounts to a five-year course in
three years to get my Bachelor’s degree in me-
chanical engineering. I’ve never worked so hard
in my life. And I did have a couple a years of Re-
serve Officers Training Corps (ROTC), so I had
an idea of what military training was like.
BOB SHELDON: Your mechanical engi-
neering courses, did they include thermody-
namics, heat transfer, and strength of materials?
SEYMOUR DEITCHMAN: Yes. Physics,
hydrodynamics, and machinery design.
BOB SHELDON: Probably a lot of math, too.
SEYMOUR DEITCHMAN: Through cal-
culus. I taught myself differential equations af-
ter I got out of school.
A recruiter came to school and he was look-
ing for people to work at the Langley Labora-
tory of the National Advisory Committee for
Aeronautics (NACA) at the time, which much
later morphed into the National Aeronautics
and Space Administration (NASA) as we know
it today. That was like inviting me to paradise,
with my love of aviation. As I was growing up
I used to make trips down to Floyd Bennett
Field where I would take pictures of the air-
planes and watch them land and take off.
BOB SHELDON: Where is Floyd Bennett
Field?
SEYMOUR DEITCHMAN: It’s in the mid-
dle of Brooklyn now, but it was way out in the
wild fields at the edge of New York at that time,
and serviced both military and civil aviation.
The procedure when I got to NACA at
Langley Field, near Hampton, Virginia, was that
I was drafted into the Army and then assigned
back there on inactive reserve. The plan was that
when somebody with the requisite qualifica-
tions came back from service overseas, he
would come and replace me, and I would go
into the active Army and be sent overseas.
Apparently no one with those qualifications
appeared, because the issue never arose. I
started at NACA by testing aircraft models for
stability and control characteristics in the seven
by ten foot wind tunnel. After 18 months or so, I
got bored with wind tunnel testing, which I’ll
describe in more detail shortly. I tried to enlist
in the Navy’s V12 program, which meant that
you got six months of training and you came
out as an ensign or a lieutenant JG [junior
grade], and got assigned to a ship. I ran into
an interesting Catch 22, because the Navy was
interested in taking me, but for me to get into
that program, I had to resign from the Army Re-
serve. As soon as I would resign from the Army
Reserve I would automatically go into the Army
infantry. So I decided to stay put.
But I did transfer from wind tunnel testing,
and went into the physics division at NACA
Langley where I did some other work.
The seven by ten foot subsonic wind tunnel,
where I started to work, was an archaic 1930s
wind tunnel design, but it could test powered
models and it mainly performed aircraft stabil-
ity and control work. That meant measuring
how the propeller slipstream and downwash
from the wing-tip vorticity (too bad you can’t
see my gestures on the page) affected the stabil-
ity and control of the airplane. If an airplane was
stable, when it was disturbed it wanted to come
back to its original orientation in the airstream;
but if it was unstable, when it was disturbed it
would go off track and into a spin or some other
undesirable behavior.
At that tunnel, the idea was to measure the
disturbing or upsetting forces, and later calculate
the consequent aircraft trajectory, so as to correct
the airplane design as needed. The model was
mounted on scales and it had no automatic
read-out. There were young women math majors,
who were mostly from colleges in North Carolina
and others nearby, who would sit at the scales
and take readings whenever I gave the word,
‘‘Okay, now,’’ because the airplane was in the
right position and the wind speed was right.
They were called ‘‘computers.’’ And they would
punch out the data on Frieden machines – if
you remember the old calculators – and plot it
up by hand. Then it was my job to interpret it
in terms of the airplane design.
I learned a lot of aerodynamics, and I also
learned to get along in an alien environment. I
should note that here was a boy, born and bred
in New York City, going down into what was
then the Deep South, in a place peopled from
the Deep South, and a totally different culture.
BOB SHELDON: This wind tunnel was in
North Carolina?
SEYMOUR DEITCHMAN: No. It was at
Langley Field, which is just outside of Hampton,
Virginia. It’s still there. And Langley Field is now
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Langley Air Force Base, the home of the U.S. Air
Force Air Combat Command Headquarters.
BOB SHELDON: Did you take a fluid dy-
namics course in college?
SEYMOUR DEITCHMAN: Yes.
BOB SHELDON: So you understood all the
math and modeling.
SEYMOUR DEITCHMAN: Pretty much – I
had to learn to extend it to the aerodynamics of
the airplane, but that wasn’t hard.
BOB SHELDON: Did you learn anything
from your wind tunnel testing that you hadn’t
learned in college?
SEYMOUR DEITCHMAN: Not a lot pro-
fessionally, although I hadn’t studied any aerody-
namics in college. I learned the basics of aircraft
lift, drag, pitching moments, and other basic air-
plane aerodynamics. But I did enjoy the work a
lot, and learning the aerodynamics, at the begin-
ning. In line with learning to get along in an alien
culture, let me interject an amusing incident.
One of the first things I learned was to tread
gently in an unfamiliar milieu. The first job I got
when I got to the seven by ten foot tunnel was to
check the design of a gearbox that had to be built
to power one of the models. The models used
electric motors with the gearbox to the propel-
ler. It had been designed by a young and very at-
tractive woman who was very popular with the
young males in the organization, a gal by the
name of Annie Timberlake. I went through her
design and tore it to pieces. That’s when I
learned you had to be very gentle with someone
as popular as Annie Timberlake. It damn near
got me thrown out of the place, but I redesigned
the gear box to my satisfaction instead of bump-
ing it back to her, and, yes, I learned that lesson
well and early on: social networks affect how
you do engineering.
In about 1945, we tested what became the
F-84 Thunderjet, our first jet combat aircraft. The
F-84 was used six years later in the Korean
War. I was beginning to learn something about
development time, which I hadn’t appreciated
before.
I got tired of wind tunnel testing, so I got
myself transferred to the physics department
where I played with supersonic flow and high-
subsonic compressible flow, which were just
coming into recognition at the time because air-
planes in steep dives were finally beginning to
go near supersonic speed. They never quite
got there, but close. I devised a method to take
Schlieren photographs in a shock tunnel.
Schlieren photographs are photographs with po-
larized light that actually show the shockwaves
attached to a body in a supersonic airstream, be-
cause the light gets refracted differently by air of
different densities. We had a small tunnel with
glass sides, so you could look through it, and I
devised a method for taking photographs of
the shockwaves so you could see how different
forms disturbed the airstream in supersonic
flow. That would come in handy later on.
So I worked on that, and the war ended.
An interesting thing came up there. The
physics division had been headed by a man
named Theodore Theodorsen, who was one of
the pioneers in aerodynamics, a very famous
person. Just before I got there, he had left to go
to Brazil and set up the Aeronautical Institute
of Brazil. The interesting thing is that now, 60
years later, we find Brazil coming up strong
and building regional jet aircraft. So there’s
a dwell time, showing how long it takes to build
an industry.
In 1947, I moved to the Cornell Aeronautical
Laboratory (CAL) in Buffalo (which has since
become the CALSPAN Corporation). That was
a lab initially built around an 8310-foot wind
tunnel that had belonged to the Curtiss-Wright
Corporation; the company was in Buffalo across
the street from what became the Lab, during the
war. After the war, Curtiss-Wright was going
into the engine business and going out of the
airplane business, so it gave the tunnel to Cor-
nell University and they kept it in place and
set up the Lab around it.
The Lab had the wind tunnel, and it had
a full-scale flight test division and a theoretical
aerodynamics division, materials and struc-
tures division, and a systems research division.
It was quite large. I don’t remember the staffing,
but somewhere between 500 and 1,000 people.
BOB SHELDON: Were you working for
Cornell University?
SEYMOUR DEITCHMAN: The Lab was
owned and operated by the university, but it
was run as a separate, independent entity. I
wasn’t conscious of those things at the time,
but probably the Board of Trustees was on the
University payroll.
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I had two tours there, as I’ll get to, but I
thought first it’d be interesting to cover some
of the significant work I did during that first
tour. On one of them, we started wind tunnel
testing an airplane that was designed by the
Avro Corporation in Canada. Avro was an off-
shoot of Avro Aeronautics, Great Britain, which
itself eventually got folded into British Aero-
space.
They had one of the first jet aircraft right af-
ter the De Havilland Comet. I learned some-
thing from them about the sponsor’s pressure
to get the results he wants. The drag on that air-
plane turned out to be higher than they liked, so
the airplane wouldn’t go as far as they wanted
or at the speed they wanted, and they kept try-
ing to push us to lower the drag. They didn’t be-
lieve the scales in the wind tunnel. (I should
note that by now the model was mounted on
a boom with electric strain gauges to measure
the aerodynamic forces. We didn’t have the
young women working as computers any more.)
They kept pushing us, and finally they just
gave up. And, in fact, they built that airplane,
but it never went anyplace commercially.
Another thing we worked on, that I spent
a lot of time on, was bomb separation from air-
craft. It was under a US Air Force contract out of
Wright Field [now part of Wright-Patterson Air
Force Base]. The high-speed airflow under the
wings, or in bomb bays, would upset the bombs;
as they left the airplane, they would tip and the
fins would damage the wings or the bomb bay
internal structure. That was a real problem.
They wanted to know, ‘‘How can we locate the
bomb, or change the airflow around it, so that
it wouldn’t do that?’’ It was a fascinating study
in the sense that it was three-pronged. We did
wind tunnel testing with ‘‘live’’ bombs that I’ll
describe shortly; theoretical aerodynamics cal-
culating the forces on the bomb, from which
we could estimate the trajectory; and then full-
scale flight tests measuring the forces, after
which we actually did bomb drops into Lake
Erie, measuring the trajectory as the bomb left
the aircraft wing (we used an F-86 for the tests).
I was the program manager for all of this. I had
to put it together, so obviously I had progressed
professionally.
The ‘‘live’’ bombs in the wind tunnel were
interesting. I should mention that in doing this
project, I met Dr. Al Flax, who was head of the
Aerodynamics Division at the time. He became
a lifelong friend. Al had made his name in aero-
nautics in the field of aeroelasticity, which is
how structures interact with the airstream in
flight. He developed the theory for wing flutter
in three-dimensions. Wing flutter occurs when
a wing becomes unstable in bending and starts
flapping very rapidly and could break easily.
Al’s name will keep coming up in what follows
because we interacted many times through the
years, in many ways.
Back to ‘‘live’’ bombs in the wind tunnel.
These were hollow plastic models of bombs that
were filled with an emulsion of red lead and oil,
to get the appropriate scale in the relationship of
weight to the moment of inertia. There were
scaling equations that eventually I had pub-
lished in the Journal of the American Institute of
Aeronautics and Astronautics (AIAA).
We would drop the scaled bomb models in
the wind tunnel and watch their flight paths
with high-speed photography, which had just
come into common use. They would splatter
on the tunnel floor and we had to mop them
up, but that was no huge problem. Meantime,
the Aerodynamics Division calculated the
forces that should be on the wing and the bomb.
Flight tests flew full scale bomb shells and mea-
sured the forces, and we got quite good correla-
tion among the model, the theory, and the full
scale measurements. Then we dropped the bomb
over Lake Erie, and, indeed, it tipped and
punched a hole in the wing flap of the F-86
fighter that dropped it. But the airplane survived.
Then we extended the tunnel work into re-
lease from bomb bays in the small supersonic
tunnel; this was in anticipation of the B-58
bomber.
BOB SHELDON: What variables did you
play with to fix the bomb drop so it didn’t tip
onto the wing?
SEYMOUR DEITCHMAN: I’m about to
get to that. In fact, those tests showed that the
bomb would have trouble getting out a bomb
bay at all because when the bomb bay opened
you’d get the flow curling around the front
and it would hold the bomb up there and the
bomb would tip and hit the airplane structure
at the top of the bomb bay and sometimes just
hang up there without leaving the aircraft.
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Let me jump ahead in history now to com-
plete this part of the narrative, and then I’ll
come back to the chronological flow.
Al Flax had become Assistant Secretary of
the Air Force for Research and Development
(R&D) when I went into the Pentagon in the Fall
of 1963 to set up the R&D program for the Viet-
nam War, an activity I will describe later. I saw
aircraft designs in reports that were passed
around, and in particular I saw one I was sure
would have bomb separation problems. I wrote
Al Flax a memo that got the Air Staff all in
a dither. I learned two things out of that. The
first was that only people of the same rank could
address an Assistant Secretary. And the second
was that bomb ejector racks had been invented.
Ejector racks pushed the bomb out so fast
through the slipstream that the tipping was no
longer a problem. That was my first lesson
about being overtaken by events through tech-
nological advance. All that work we did on
the aerodynamics of bomb separation - the
equivalent of about $10 million worth of work
today - didn’t really matter any more.
Now, back to the Cornell Aero Lab (CAL). I
worked for a long time on another issue that
was overtaken by technological advances. I
worked for several months converting the
8x10 tunnel to a transonic tunnel, and that
meant shaping the tunnel throat correctly to
get the transonic aerodynamic flow (about
Mach number 1.2), in such a way as to keep
the supersonic-subsonic transition shock wave
at the exit from the tunnel throat from moving
back over the model. You wanted to keep it
downstream of the tunnel throat. The tunnel
throat had to be shaped like a supersonic nozzle
and be perfectly smooth. Something like a bolt
head protruding a millimeter, or a small ran-
dom variation in the throat contour, would set
off the shock wave at the throat and keep the
tunnel from going transonic. We had adjust-
ment screws on the outside of the tunnel to get
the nozzle shape right, and it was just a long
process to get it – and keep it – perfect.
While this was going on, Al Flax came back
from a stint as Chief Scientist of the Air Force
with a new design for a slotted-throat wind tun-
nel, which meant the tunnel throat had an array
of longitudinal slots from the subsonic to the su-
personic part. The slots absorbed small pertur-
bations in the flow so that you could shape the
tunnel throat correctly and keep the transition
shock wave where you wanted it, and it stayed
there. That was another example of being over-
taken by technological advance. I learned a lot
about that kind of thing early in my career.
Eventually I got tired of wind tunnel testing
so I left the CAL and I went to Bell Aircraft,
which was also in Buffalo, on the other side of
town toward Niagara Falls.
BOB SHELDON: What year was that?
SEYMOUR DEITCHMAN: Approximately
1953-54, because there’s a landmark which hap-
pened in 1955-56, that I’ll describe shortly.
There were several amusing and interesting
things at Bell Aircraft. One was that Larry Bell,
who set up the company and still worked there
when I was there, insisted that he was going to
punch the time clock. He was going to be a reg-
ular guy, which meant everyone who worked
there, including the professional staff, had to
punch a time clock. There went the flextime I
had enjoyed at the CAL.
The aerodynamics department was in a very
large open room with desks next to each other,
a lot of hubbub all around. I talked to Paul
Emmons, the Chief of Aerodynamics - a won-
derful, friendly guy. I said, ‘‘It’s hard to get
any work done here.’’ And he said, ‘‘Sy, air-
planes started out being built in barns and
they’re always going to be built in barns.’’ So I
lived with that.
Another interesting thing was that German
General Dornberger, who had been in charge of
all of the World War II German rocket work at
Peenemunde, was now at Bell Aircraft. He
made a proposal for what was called DynaSoar
(dynamic soaring) - a sub-orbital vehicle that
would be a very fast bomber. Of course, that
was overtaken by satellites and supersonic
bombers. But just recently in Aviation Week, I
saw that someone’s trying to revive the idea.
Some things never die.
The thing I put most of my time into there
was designing the trajectory of a missile called
the RASCAL. First, I ought to describe the com-
puter that I was working with, because this was
long before the days of electronic computers, or
just maybe at the beginning of those days. This
was a huge metal frame, about six feet long
and three feet high and three feet deep, that
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was full of gears and levers and electric motors.
You had to adjust the lever arms on all these
things to do the calculations you wanted, all
based on leverage calculations and gear ratios.
The RASCAL missile was very interesting
because it was a big beast. Launched subsoni-
cally from an aircraft, it climbed to a very high
altitude, went supersonic, cruised for about
100 miles and then went into a radar-guided ter-
minal dive against a ship. The US never was in-
terested in that missile, but it showed up as the
Soviet Union’s AS-4. That’s exactly the Backfire-
launched missile that became the main threat
against aircraft carriers, because it could home
in on the corner reflector made by the flight deck
and the island. That’s an interesting example of
inadvertent technology transfer. How they got
it, I have no idea.
Also, during that period, I went to the Uni-
versity of Buffalo (UB) at night and got my Mas-
ters in Engineering. My thesis, which I did
partly on stolen time at Bell when the profes-
sional work was slow, was on the subsonic
downwash field behind a wing due to the tip
vorticity. Because there weren’t good computers
at the time, I devised an approximate method
for calculating the downwash field behind
a swept-back wing that didn’t entail a lot of cal-
culation. Swept-back wings were just coming
into use for high speed aircraft, and this was
a hot topic at the time for stability and control
calculations.
At UB, I had to defend that thesis just like
a PhD thesis. It was quite a big do as far as they
were concerned. It was published in The Journal
of the American Institute for Aeronautic and Astro-
nautics, and I hope somebody used it at some
time. I never went on for my PhD because the
professional work just got very interesting and
my wife and I were starting our family. I was
starting to travel a lot and there was just no op-
portunity to go back to school.
BOB SHELDON: What was your master’s
degree in?
SEYMOUR DEITCHMAN: It was called
an MS in Engineering and included a lot of work
on theory of elasticity and some advanced math
related to stress analysis of structures.
It might be interesting to note some of the
bureaucratics of a university, which probably
haven’t changed much in all these years. When
I was at Langley Field, a friend and I would bor-
row a room in the local high school at night and
we went through a textbook and taught our-
selves differential equations. I wanted to get
credit for the course at UB, and I volunteered
to take the exam to show that I was qualified.
They said, ‘‘No. You can’t do that. You have to
take the course.’’ Well, I didn’t take the course,
but nobody noticed, and I got my master’s de-
gree anyway. That’s the kind of thing that will
keep showing up as we go through this oral his-
tory: I have fought the bureaucracy throughout
my whole career.
I also spent a lot of time at Bell, when there
was spare time, looking through Methods of Op-
erations Research by Morse and Kimball, and I
became interested in operations research. I fi-
nally realized I was going nowhere profession-
ally, so after about 20 months at Bell, I talked
to Ira Ross, the President of the Cornell Aero
Lab, and went back there into the Systems Re-
search Division.
BOB SHELDON: What year did you finish
your master’s degree?
SEYMOUR DEITCHMAN: 1955. The first
thing I did there was work on air traffic control.
General Edward Curtis was a friend of Presi-
dent Eisenhower. Air traffic control had turned
into a god-awful mess. If I recall, there were
something like 80 agencies that had something
to do with qualifying airplanes to fly and man-
aging traffic control. Ike wanted to do some-
thing about that. He asked General Curtis to
pull together an organization that would study
the problem and tell them how to straighten it
all out.
At just about that time, when transport air-
planes flew transcontinental – (this was DC-6s
and DC-7s, Constellations, and other propeller-
driven aircraft) – they would circle the Grand
Canyon to show everybody what a wonderful
sight it was. Two of them came together over
the Canyon, and about 180 people were killed.
That really emphasized the need to make some
order out of the air traffic control mess.
There were three outfits involved in the
Curtis study. CAL concentrated on forecasting
where aviation was going; Airborne Instru-
ments Lab, which was in New York, did the traf-
fic measurement and worked on the traffic
control aspects of communications and radar;
MORS ORAL HISTORY PROJECT . . . MR. SEYMOUR J. DEITCHMAN
Page 66 Military Operations Research, V15 N2 2010
an economic research organization in Cam-
bridge, Massachusetts projected the traffic de-
mand. These outputs were all put together to
make up the final report, which Gen Curtis cov-
ered with a brief summary.
Among other things that I worked on dur-
ing this study was the question of supersonic
transports and what they might do to the air
traffic control systems. I looked into that issue
and concluded that there would be supersonic
transports, but at a price. At the time, it appeared
that the only way you could get transatlantic
range was to use a boron-based fuel called ‘‘zip
fuel,’’ because it had a much higher heating value
than kerosene-based jet fuel. Then you could get
the long range, but the boron in the fuel would
have made an environmental mess because it
would dump combustion products consisting
of boron oxides like borax powder into the atmo-
sphere, and that would have settled to the sur-
face and been a dangerous pollutant.
We had talked to several of the aircraft com-
panies about supersonic transport prototypes. I
projected that the prototype would be flying in
the early 1970s and it would be so expensive
to fly that you’d have to charge a very high fare.
Therefore, there weren’t going to be enough of
them to worry about; they would fly above the
subsonic traffic enroute, and around airports
they’d fly subsonically anyway, so they would
fit in with the rest of the traffic.
Then the Concorde came along in the early
1970s and bore out my forecast exactly. I should
have gotten out of the forecasting business then.
What I didn’t anticipate was the turbofan
engine, which made the Concorde possible.
That engine was efficient enough that it could
use ordinary jet fuel. That made the Concorde
possible, because it never would have flown
with the boron fuels. The environmental impact
would have been too severe. So there are things
you don’t anticipate in technological forecast-
ing – you might be right in the large but for
the wrong reasons in detail.
That work led to the Airways Moderniza-
tion Board, which later became the Federal Avi-
ation Agency in 1958. It didn’t become an
‘‘Administration’’ until 1967 when it was folded
into the Department of Transportation. Thus the
air traffic control work at CAL did lead ulti-
mately to what is now known as the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA), and we contin-
ued a lot of work for them.
Some of the significant outputs that I
worked on included: showing the Agency that
they could locate their air traffic control research
center at Atlantic City, New Jersey where it still
is. The reason was you had the busiest airway in
the world, between Florida and Boston going up
the East Coast, and they would be alongside of it
so they could observe that traffic. They could
see what happened if they changed the methods
of en-route control and things like that, without
interfering with the traffic. So that was good.
In another project, they were searching for
a location for Dulles Airport. We looked at the
traffic flow in the Washington, DC area and
found that traffic at an airport in the location
that was initially proposed would interfere with
traffic at both Andrews Air Force Base, Mary-
land and Washington National Airport traffic.
We recommended the site at what is now Hern-
don, where it is today.
At the same time, we started working for
the Army on Army air mobility. It was spon-
sored by the first group of Army aviation enthu-
siasts led by Colonel Williams starting in 1956 or
so. They were running into a problem. There
was one twin-rotor helicopter with the rotors
set longitudinally at both ends. I think it was
the H-21. The French had used it very exten-
sively in their war in Algeria.
The Army wanted to develop a more ad-
vanced twin-rotor helicopter which turned out
to be the CH-47 Chinook. They were having
a problem with it because they couldn’t get
the hot-day performance that they wanted. For
hot-day performance, the specification was it
had to be able to lift its full payload at 95 degrees
Fahrenheit temperature and 6,000 feet altitude.
I did a study of the geography on the whole
southern Eurasian perimeter, which is where
we thought we’d be involved in warfare. It
turned out you almost never ran into those con-
ditions. The critical conditions occurred where
we are now, around the Iraqi Desert where 100
degrees and 3,000 feet would be critical for heli-
copter performance. Changing the specification
was much easier on the design of the aircraft, so
they were able to go ahead with it; successive
versions of the Chinook are still Army standard
transports.
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They also asked us to look at a utility heli-
copter, the Bell UH-1, and we told them that it
wouldn’t be cost-effective. That turned out to
be the Huey of Vietnam fame, and it’s in service
in some areas still. Showing, again, that in cost-
effectiveness analysis you can be right some of
the time but not all of the time.
Our work helped the Secretary of Defense,
‘‘Engine Charlie’’ Wilson, to issue the Wilson Di-
rective dividing aviation between the Army and
the Air Force, which still is in effect. Basically,
what he did was give the Army rotary-wing air-
craft and give the Air Force fixed-wing aircraft.
There are some exceptions: the Army can have
some small transport aircraft, and the Air Force
operates some utility as well as search and rescue
helicopters, but in the main that’s the way it’s set
up now. Some of the issues in the decision were:
What does it take to maintain those aircraft?
What does it take to sustain them? What does it
take to buy them? What do you have to know?
We helped them with their decision.
I also did some work on bombing accuracy,
which I’ll come back to later because it’s been
a continuing interest. At that point I concluded
that with the weapons available at the time,
the only way to get good accuracy was with
dive bombing. That was going to change, as
I’ll indicate later on.
Another significant thing happened profes-
sionally. Mark Kac, who is the father of proba-
bility theory and was at Cornell University,
came up to the Lab and gave a course on Fourier
transforms, which I took. I don’t remember any-
thing about Fourier transforms, but I remember
one of his dictums about making assumptions.
His example was the ‘‘snowplow problem.’’
The snowplow problem is the following: it
started snowing at 6:00 a.m. in Ithaca and I want
to have the streets cleared by noon; how many
plows do I send out? And that’s all you know.
He illustrated how you can make reasonable as-
sumptions, and write the differential equations
for getting the streets clean. That, I’ve never for-
gotten: If you don’t have enough information,
make some reasonable assumptions, and that
has stood me in good stead through the remain-
der of my professional life (and personal life,
too, I might add).
In 1960, the opportunity arose for what was
supposed to be a year in Washington on loan to
a relatively new organization called the Institute
for Defense Analyses (IDA). At that time, that
organization was built mainly around the
Weapons System Evaluation Group (WSEG),
which worked with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, per-
forming operations research and systems analy-
ses (ORSA) for them. IDA had just set up a new
organization, the Research and Engineering
Support Group, at the request of Herb York,
who was then the Director of Defense Research
& Engineering (DDR&E). (And, parenthetically,
I got to know Herb pretty well too when he later
became an IDA Trustee.)
At any rate, he had asked for technical sup-
port on research, engineering and related ORSA
matters. At first the way the IDA organization
outside of WSEG worked was to borrow people
from industry. IDA had what was informally
known as a ‘‘CAL’’ slot. The opportunity came
up to go there because the current incumbent
was returning to CAL, and I heard about it. I ag-
itated to go because I was ready for a change
again. We moved to Washington. I was inter-
viewed by Charlie Townes, who was then Vice
President for Research at IDA and later won
the Nobel Prize in physics for the invention of
the maser and the laser. I passed muster there
and was offered the appointment.
Interestingly enough, the first task I got was
to look into machine translation of language, for
the Director of Research and Advanced Tech-
nology within the Office of DDR&E in the Pen-
tagon. That’s something we’re just beginning to
learn how to do now, over forty years later. The
issue, then as now, was how to handle semantics
and idiom. Semantics and idiom go together,
and they’re different in all languages. When
you finally have a big enough memory, you
can begin to translate one into the other if you
set it up such that the machine knows what to
look for. And finally, we’re getting there.
There was some machine translation of U.S.
tech manuals into Vietnamese during the Viet-
nam War. I never learned how well that worked,
i.e., whether the Vietnamese could understand
the manuals, but that was a practical attempt
to deal with it.
Among other things during that first stint at
IDA I worked with three social scientists. One
was the late Jesse Orlansky, a human factors
psychologist from Dunlap & Associates in
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Connecticut, who arrived at IDA the same week
I did, also on a one-year assignment. We both
stayed on for a long time, except for my stint
in the DoD, into the 1980s and beyond. Another
was the late Joseph E Barmack (JEB), a psycho-
logist who eventually became head of the psy-
chology department at CCNY. The third was
social psychologist Alex Bavelas, a brilliant
guy with a fiendish imagination. To illustrate
that, I’ll mention an experiment he had set up
(outside of IDA) that’s worth describing for
the interest of it.
He had somebody plant a rumor in a rail car
in New Haven, on the New York, New Haven,
and Hartford Railway. It was done just by hav-
ing a couple of people seated side by side and
talking to each other in a loud voice. It was an
outlandish rumor; I can’t remember what it
was, but of topical interest. Then he had people
stationed all around Grand Central Station in
New York listening to what people were saying
when they got off the train. That rumor had
gone through the whole train in the 40 minutes
it took to go from New Haven to New York. That
says a lot about what one can do in psychologi-
cal operations.
Be that as it may, I learned from these three
people about the social sciences and human fac-
tors engineering, a result that will have an effect
on later adventures in my career, as will be seen.
Then, during the year that I was assigned
there, IDA reorganized and it was decided to es-
tablish the Research and Engineering Support
Division (RESD) with a permanent staff, and I
was invited to stay at IDA. John Kincaid, the Di-
vision Director, came to me and said, ‘‘Sy, I like
the way you work. You’re a self-starter and
that’s what we need, so would you stay on?’’
There followed a lot of soul-searching and ask-
ing what would I do if I went back to CAL, ques-
tions to which I didn’t get a satisfactory answer,
so I decided to stay. Thus, my one-year leave in
Washington became 48 and still counting. We
bought our house in 1961 and we’re still in it.
During the first year at IDA I had also been
doing some work on tactical warfare, looking at
the tactical warfare budget and the emphasis in
it and where it might be changed. This was now
1961. Harold Brown was DDR&E, which at that
time was, according to law, the Number 3 spot
in the DoD. The Acquisition Executive (AE)
hadn’t yet been separated out, so Harold was
Chief of Research, Development, Test, and Eval-
uation (RDT&E), as well as the AE.
We were just getting started in Vietnam
and Congress appropriated $120 million for
‘‘limited war,’’ whatever that was, and Harold
wanted to know how that money should be
spent. He set up the Limited War Task Group,
which came to be chaired by Luis Alvarez,
and I was named the Executive Secretary of
the Group because I had been working on lim-
ited war kinds of things at IDA.
(As a slight amusing aside, Daniel Ellsberg
was on that panel, and I got to know Dan well
enough that when the Pentagon Papers were bro-
ken loose, I said to myself, ‘‘I bet Dan did that.’’ I
turned out to be right.)
Most of the panel went to Vietnam, because
the war was just breaking out, and they wanted
to see the place at first hand. I went with four
other Group members to Europe and the Mid-
dle East. Then I decided, since we were going
to the Middle East (Teheran), to take a couple
of days off and go to Israel, which I did at my
own expense. There was a Marine colonel along
with us who wanted to go there too, so we went
together. He knew Israeli Col Yariv, who had
been the Israeli military attache´ in the U.S.,
and he told him we were going to be there. Yariv
arranged a meeting with General Rabin, who
was then the Vice Chief of Staff.
The Israelis are very blunt. We came in, sat
down in his office, and as usual in Israel, there
was a table with a big bowl of fruit in front of
his desk. After inviting us to partake of the fruit,
he said out of the blue, ‘‘So you’re here to study
limited war. Who do you think you’re going to
fight in this area?’’ I mumbled some words
about people with Soviet weapons. And he said,
‘‘No. I’ll tell you what you’re going to do. A war
is going to start between us and the Arabs and
you’re going to try to interpose yourselves.
And I’ll tell you, I’ll have it over with before
you can get here.’’
The fascinating thing to me was that he was
describing to me the top-secret plan I had been
briefed on at the Middle East Command in Lon-
don. I didn’t tell him that, but he had reasoned
that that would be the only approach we (the
U.S.) would reasonably be able to take. And,
his prophecy about having it over quickly came
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true in the 1967 war (I came to understand after-
wards that he was the architect of the Israeli
strategy in that war).
We came out of the task force effort recom-
mending that there be a big increase in R&D
on items related to tactical warfare and limited
warfare because there had been very little
until then (although I found out later, when I
had to pull the R&D program for Vietnam to-
gether – see below) that much of the ongoing
R&D program that had been started for other
reasons could be adapted to yield outputs use-
ful in the Vietnam War). That report is what
led ARPA, (the Advanced Research Projects
Agency) to start Project Agile, which was a tacti-
cal warfare R&D program aimed primarily at
the developing war in Vietnam. I made myself
very unpopular with the first director – an asso-
ciate ARPA deputy director who had come to
ARPA from the Marines and the intelligence
community (as I recall hearing) named Bill
Godel, because I asked him a couple of ques-
tions at the first meeting we had in which he
was looking for IDA help in setting up Project
Agile.
He wanted to make a spraying apparatus to
put on airplanes and helicopters to distribute
Agent Orange because they’d been told by Sir
Robert Thompson, who had been chief of the
counterinsurgency in Malaya, that part of pro-
tecting the population against insurgent attack
was to clear the brush away from the roads
and the villages to keep the insurgents from hid-
ing there. (It turned out in the long run that
the Malaya and Vietnam situations were totally
different, but that’s a separate issue.) Godel
wanted to spread Agent Orange for the pur-
pose, and I asked him, ‘‘Does anybody have
any idea how that’s going to affect people, be-
cause it’s going to be all over them when you
spray it.’’ He didn’t like that. He said, ‘‘I’ve
got a war to fight and don’t bother me with that
kind of crap.’’ The second question was, that he
was pushing the Colt AR-15 rifle (the light-
weight assault rifle had just appeared at the
time) for the Vietnamese because, he said, the
big M1 Garand rifle (the then-standard U.S. in-
fantry rifle) was too heavy for them to handle,
and its kickback was hurting their shoulders
when they fired it. I asked, ‘‘Well, the Vietcong
seem to be doing quite well with captured
ones – aren’t they Vietnamese also?’’ He didn’t
like that either.
However, I was wrong about the AR-15,
similar to my assessment of the Huey, because
it became the M16 assault rifle, the main U.S. in-
fantry assault rifle. The irony is that the Viet-
namese Army didn’t get it until 1968, and this
conversation took place in 1961 or 1962.
From the Alvarez Committee, I went more
deeply into the limited war studies that I’ve
mentioned, and based on my observations
about the developing war in Vietnam I wrote
a paper developing a variant of the Lanchester
equations for guerilla warfare. The classic Lan-
chester equations consider two sides fighting
symmetrically. If both sides are fighting in the
open, this leads to the Square Law in which
the relative fighting strength of the two sides
compare according to the square of the number
of people on each side. If the two sides are in
hiding so their people are invisible to each other,
the equations lead to the Linear Law, in which
relative fighting strength is simply proportional
to the number of people on each side.
In counterinsurgency, you usually have one
side in hiding, but the other side in the open,
which is the usual sort of guerrilla ambush situ-
ation, and nobody had written that up. I wrote
that paper, which I’ve been told since that time
has been considered by the OR community to
be a classic, although I had no idea it would
be viewed that way at the time.
I also wrote my first book during my time at
IDA in the early 1960s. The book was called Lim-
ited War and American Defense Policy, and in it I
tried to wrap up what I was learning about the
U.S. trying to fight limited wars. One of the
points I made in the book was that ballistic
missiles didn’t hold a candle to reusable aircraft
in terms of the cost-effectiveness of firepower
that can be delivered over a period of time.
That’s a key point, and I will come back to it
later on. Also, I had looked at the Tacnuke
[tactical nuclear weapons] problem in context
of the relative deterrent value of NATO IRBMs
[intermediate-range ballistic missiles] and air-
craft, and my conclusions were of interest to
Secretary McNamara, who quoted them as
part of the basis for the strategy he was devel-
oping to deal with the NATO-Warsaw Pact
standoff.
MORS ORAL HISTORY PROJECT . . . MR. SEYMOUR J. DEITCHMAN
Page 70 Military Operations Research, V15 N2 2010
But the main significance of the book in ret-
rospect was that I had worked out a very simply
stated strategy for counterinsurgency: you have
to defend the population, you have to go after
the insurgents, and you have to change the con-
ditions that induce the population to help the
insurgents. That is now Gen Petraeus’ policy
in Iraq and, I believe, in Afghanistan (not
that I think Gen Petraeus used my recommen-
ded strategy, but the approach has to be obvious
to anyone who thinks seriously about the
problem). However, I was told by Paul Gor-
man –whom I knew in the Pentagon well before
he became the four-star Commander in Chief of
our Southern Command when it was in Pan-
ama, that ‘‘This is still the classic on counterin-
surgency.’’ Paul hauled out his copy of that
book and made his comment at a counterinsur-
gency strategy meeting at IDA in the early 1990s
(which, interestingly, included Ollie North
among others). It was nice to think I had created
something that would last. And thinking about
it now, I have to say that although the strategy is
simply stated, it can be fiendishly difficult to
carry out.
Along the way, also because of my previous
experience with Army aviation at CAL, I be-
came involved on the periphery of planning
for the tests of the first helicopter mobile divi-
sion, which at the time was called the 11th Air
Assault Division. I had met Colonel Harry
Kinnard, who’d been in the Pentagon and was
planning those tests, and who later became
commander of the Division.
That division went into a lot of operational
testing and exercises in the Carolinas, leading
to its final organization, tactics and equipment.
They made a lot of changes from the original
design along the way. It was sent, in 1965, to
Vietnam by Secretary McNamara, as the First
Cavalry Division (Air Mobile), under the com-
mand of then-Major General Harry Kinnard. I
was privileged to visit them at their headquar-
ters at An Khe in the central highlands of Viet-
nam.
BOB SHELDON: Was this just before the Ia
Drang campaign?
SEYMOUR DEITCHMAN: Yes. I was there
just before the Battle of the Ia Drang Valley. But
the Division was just getting started in its new
environment.
What was fascinating to me, in addition to
the huge field full of helicopters that they called
‘‘the parking lot,’’ was a mountain called Hong
Kong Mountain, right in the middle of their
quite large area of occupation. General Kinnard
said, ‘‘On top of that mountain, it’s full of Viet-
cong. By patrolling, we keep them up there.
They’re not bothering us, and that’s easier than
trying to root them out.’’ That was a good illus-
tration of the complexity of the Vietnam envi-
ronment.
As a result of working with the Alvarez
group, the work I had been doing at IDA, and
the book I had written, I was invited to join Harold
Brown’s DDR&E staff as his special assistant
for counterinsurgency. What he asked me to do
was to build and coordinate the R&D program
to support what was now a full-fledged war ef-
fort in Vietnam.
I started working in OSD in October of
1963, and I reported to Harold through John
McLucas, who was the Deputy for Tactical
Warfare Programs in ODDR&E. When I came
in and first talked with John McLucas I com-
mented that I had done a lot of reading about the
French war in Indochina. I said, ‘‘This is a war
about people, and I think we don’t understand
the enemy very well at all. We have to do some re-
search on how to deal with the population of the
area that we’re trying to defend. And that means
doing some work in the social sciences.’’ John
responded by saying ‘‘That sounds interesting.
Let’s go see what Harold thinks.’’
Harold said, ‘‘That’s fine. Do it. But I want
you to build the R&D program to support the
war, and get that ARPA bunch out of the Ser-
vices’ hair,’’ referring to the fact that there had
been a lot of cross-service and ARPA interfer-
ence at the time. Every organization was build-
ing up its own R&D programs. I had my
assignment, and also the freedom to try to build
the program as I thought was necessary.
That tour in the Pentagon lasted two years,
and I thought now it would be useful to cover
some interesting things that occurred during
the tour.
BOB SHELDON: Let me back up to your
first trip to Vietnam. What was your sense of
how things were going in the country? Did
you get to observe some of the operations and
get a first-hand feel?
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SEYMOUR DEITCHMAN: A quick an-
swer to the question, and I’ll come to it more
later. ARPA had a field unit in Vietnam. When
I was in DDR&E, I would visit that field unit.
When I was head of Project Agile, it was my
field unit. I would talk to the people there. It
was run by a senior U.S. colonel, and he had a to-
tal of about 30 U.S. military people and 30 Viet-
namese counterparts of equivalent rank. We
had a couple of majors and several captains
and lieutenants and enlisted people.
I would talk to them about how the war was
going and I would talk to the researchers, the
R&D people. I would get a much better idea of
what was happening in that war than the
canned briefings – the command briefings that
all visitors, including me, would get. That
way, I think I had a much more realistic view
of how the war was going. The command brief-
ings tended to be optimistic, predicting how
soon the war could be won, and such, but from
what the Field Unit and researchers said, it
appeared it would be much more difficult for
the Vietnamese to succeed. There was a lot of in-
competence in the Vietnamese officer corps, and
much corruption, and the Vietcong pretty much
called the shots on when and where the fighting
would take place. I’m going to get to more of
that later.
Let me deal with the bureaucratics first.
When I got into the Pentagon, the first thing I
did was set up a coordinating committee that
included representatives of the Services and
ARPA. In the group, we gathered together all
the things the Services and ARPA said they
were doing in R&D for Southeast Asia for the
war. I also drafted memos for the Services re-
garding work I thought needed to be done. Usu-
ally, these memos were prepared for signature
by Harold Brown to the assistant secretaries,
according to how the bureaucracy worked.
Among other things, that set included my
memo on social sciences.
At that time there was a social scientist in
OSD, Rains Wallace, a psychologist who later
headed the psychology department at Ohio
State. His job was mainly training and educa-
tion and human factors engineering. We became
good friends and he and I worked together quite
a bit; this will come up in context of Project
Camelot, which I will get to shortly.
DDR&E, by that time had $250 million in
what Congress called an emergency fund to al-
locate for R&D on the war, and it was up to me,
really, to figure out how it was to be spent. I
would make recommendations to Harold and
he would, most of the time, decide, ‘‘Okay,
that’s a good expenditure. Let’s do it.’’ Through
my coordinating committee, the Services knew I
had access to that money, and typically, they
would start trying to load on all kinds of extra-
neous or impossible projects.
One was, for example, a bombing system
for the B-52 to bomb from low altitude. My re-
sponse to that was, ‘‘You’re not bombing from
low altitude in Vietnam and you have all kinds
of strategic money to do that. No. You can’t have
that money.’’
Another one that came from the Air Force
was that they proposed putting a satellite with
a huge dish to keep on station over Vietnam. It
would reflect sunlight down over the Mekong
Delta region and light up the battlefield so star-
light scopes could be used all night – it would be
the Air Force’s artificial moon. It turned out
when we did the costing and looked at what
the capability to keep on station at that time
was, it would have been a gross waste of money.
At this point, I’d like to pay tribute to Gene
Fubini. He came to the Pentagon from Airborne
Instruments Lab, the same organization that I
had worked with during the Curtis Study. He
was the principal deputy DDR&E. He had a fan-
tastically brilliant mind and was extremely
blunt. He would ask difficult questions when
the Services would come to brief him on pro-
grams. If they couldn’t answer the questions,
he would just say, ‘‘Get out of my office and
come back when you know what you’re doing,’’
and things like that made him famous through-
out the DoD system. Years later there was a trib-
ute dinner to him that included everybody he
had ever worked with, and the festivities were
replete with stories like that. But the point
was, he trained the R&D system to a level of
rigor that it would not have achieved otherwise.
As an example of how he and I interacted: I
would send memos up to the front office saying
we needed to do certain things. And I’d get back
a note that said, ‘‘What’s wrong with your
memo is XXX.’’ I finally said to myself, ‘‘I have
to make it with this guy or get fired. I have to
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keep pushing.’’ One of the things I said after I
came back from one of my trips to Vietnam
was, ‘‘We’ve got to do more operations research
there. They don’t really know how the enemy is
functioning, nor how we are performing against
him.’’
He called me into his office and said, ‘‘Why
are you saying that?’’ He gave me a half-hour
grilling on why we needed more operations re-
search in Vietnam. I thought, ‘‘Well, he doesn’t
believe it, but okay.’’ After I’d been there about
six months or so, I arranged, (with their help,
of course) a very large meeting that included
Harold, Fubini, and John McLucas, all the Ser-
vices’ assistant secretaries for R&D, and all the
military R&D chiefs. I had the Services and
ARPA come in and show all their programs.
We had an open discussion about all of it, so ev-
erybody knew where the gaps and overlaps
were and we could start working on that to-
gether. As part of that meeting (which was
a key part of trying to keep the service and
ARPA programs from falling all over each
other) Gene commented in annoyance at some
service presentation that ‘‘Sy Deitchman sends
me these magnificent memos about this subject,
and you guys are totally unresponsive to direc-
tion, etc., etc.’’ That was how I knew I had actu-
ally made it with Gene.
Another interesting anecdote about the
learning process along the way. ARPA, the Air
Force, and the Army were all working on bea-
cons to guide aircraft to a drop zone. The air-
craft, usually C-47s, would come in very low
to avoid enemy fire and drop their packages of
supplies out the back door. I thought, ‘‘Why
do we have to work on three different beacons?
Let’s have one.’’ So I said, ‘‘Okay, we’re going to
have a fly-off.’’ And we did. The Air Force bea-
con won the fly-off, and that’s the beacon we
went with. The price we paid for being careful
was that the beacon came a year later than it
might have otherwise, while it was needed in
the field ‘‘now’’.
Finally, I ran into the arcanities of the re-
quirements process. I found that things the Ser-
vices and ARPA worked on weren’t going to
Vietnam to meet what we knew were urgent
needs. And why not? I arranged a large meeting
at HQ, Commander-in-Chief Pacific Command
(CINCPAC), in Hawaii, and invited all the peo-
ple I had worked with on my coordinating
committee, and representatives from Military
Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV), and
CINCPAC; CINCPAC was really running the
war and was in overall command, including
command over MACV.
The question before the meeting was: ‘‘Why
aren’t things being delivered out there?’’ It
turned out ‘‘There’s no requirement. You offer
us something, which we have probably told
you informally we need, but we have no way
to take it because there’s no requirement.’’ It
was a purely bureaucratic thing. We fixed that
by having MACV set up a requirements section
and we worked very closely with them, so that
when they knew something was in work, they
established a formal ‘‘requirement’’ for it so that
the Services or ARPA could send it out there and
MACV could accept it. That got it done, and it
may have been the most important thing I did
in my two and a quarter years as Special Assis-
tant, Counterinsurgency (COIN).
Ironically, it reduced the time from idea to
the field from seven years, which I had been
clocking, to somewhere between two and four
years. While in many cases that was still too
long, that little bureaucratic change made a huge
difference.
Now let me go on to some of the technical
things. We were pressed to originate new
things, and I very well remember a conversation
I had with Harold Brown. We were looking at
a whole bunch of things the Services had pro-
posed, and most of them were weapons. And
he said, ‘‘Where’s the greatest need?’’ I said,
‘‘It’s finding the enemy.’’ He said, ‘‘Well, there’s
hardly anything here on that.’’ I said, ‘‘Right, be-
cause there are no new ideas.’’ I think that’s still
true, actually.
There was a serious weapon need in one
case, however, and that was to respond rapidly
to ambushes. The U.S. Army Limited War Lab
developed a variation of the Claymore mine
that would fill the bill. The Claymore mine at
the time was a circular thing about a foot across
filled with explosive, somewhat domed-shaped
on top, and with dozens of pellets embedded,
each of which was about a half inch in diameter
and a half inch long. The charge was attached to
the side of the vehicle, and was designed to
blow those pellets out in a fan shape, so that
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when trucks (usually the lead truck in a convoy)
came under fire from an ambush, the enemy
might get off the first shot, but then the Clay-
more would go off and that would be very effec-
tive in silencing further enemy fire. That
weapon was one of the things that led to this
whole issue of the requirements process, be-
cause, having been told informally by people
in MACV that it was needed, we developed it
and offered it to them and they said, ‘‘Well, we
have no requirement for that.’’
I was also, interestingly enough, midwife to
the gunship, which is one of the Air Force’s
main weapons now. A couple of majors from
Wright Field came to my office one day and they
said, ‘‘We’ve got this idea but we can’t get any-
body on the Air Staff to be interested in it. Let us
show you a film.’’ They set up a movie projector
and projected on the wall in my office. It was
a DC-3 - a military version, the C-47 - with
a 7.62-millimeter Gatling gun shooting out the
side window.
They put the airplane into a tight circle with
a steep bank so they could point the wing down
at the target, and then fired that gun. They had
done that over water outside of Eglin Field,
and there was a big wooden platform in the wa-
ter for them to shoot at. When that stream of fire
crossed that platform, it totally disintegrated.
And my first thought was, ‘‘Wow. What a way
to support villages that come under attack.’’
I’d been in Vietnam on top of the Rex Bachelor
Officer Quarters (BOQ) in Saigon and watched
the flares drop and knew there was a fight going
on at a village. There had been no good way to
beat off the Vietcong attackers, who usually
could overrun the village, and then would kill
the village chief and terrorize the villagers into
being Vietcong supporters. I said to myself,
‘‘Boy, that’s an ideal weapon for that.’’
I told Harold about it, and he said, ‘‘Okay.
Let’s see the film.’’ After he saw it he had lunch in
the Blue Room where the higher level officials -
assistant secretaries and up - usually would go
for lunch. General LeMay, then Chief of Staff
of the Air Force, was there. Harold told LeMay
about the gunship experiment and the fact that
the inventors couldn’t get any attention to it in
the Air Force. LeMay said, ‘‘Well, hell. Let’s
get it out to Vietnam and try it.’’ Those two ma-
jors got their chance and that was the beginning
of the gunship. It has gone through I don’t know
how many generations now, but it’s still a pri-
mary Air Force weapon, used by the Special
Air Warriors [now Air Force Special Operations
Command]. We keep hearing about it being
used in Iraq, and I think it was used in Somalia
just last year or so against some rebels there. I
helped that go.
In another adventure, Paul Gorman, who I
mentioned earlier, was a lieutenant colonel at
the time. He came to me asking for my help be-
cause the Chief of Staff of the Army, General
Harold Johnson at the time, had wanted a time-
table, a schedule for winning this war. Paul
asked for my help in crafting it. I said, ‘‘Paul,
you know you can’t have a schedule because
the Vietnamese have to be able to shape up to
do certain things. You can have a sequence of
events, but you can’t have a schedule.’’ He said,
‘‘The Chief of Staff wants a schedule. I’m going
to give him one.’’ We see that kind of thing hap-
pening today, in Iraq and Afghanistan. Is there
nothing new under the sun?
In another area, the Army had a need for
$40 million to improve its uniforms, weapons,
and the soldier’s pack. As one example of the
problems that needed fixing, pocket fasteners
had changed from clips, where you’d put a but-
ton through the buttonhole and just rotate it, to
Velcro. Velcro in the jungle at night was deadly
because it made a noise, and, in fact, the static
electricity when the Velcro was pulled apart
would give off a little flash. If the troops were
there in ambush watching an enemy patrol go
by, then they couldn’t move to engage the en-
emy. They couldn’t get ammunition out of their
pockets. That’s just one example of a whole
slew of things like that, needed to make the sol-
dier’s job easier and safer, which added up to
$40 million.
At that time, I knew Charlie Poor, Deputy
Assistant Secretary of the Army for R&D, quite
well. I had met him when I was still at CAL do-
ing some of our aviation work and he was at
a high level at Aberdeen Proving Ground. I
went to see him and I said, ‘‘Charlie, if you just
took the uncertainty in the cost projections
for Nike Zeus –’’ which was the Army’s anti-
ballistic missile (ABM) system at the time -
‘‘you could cover this.’’ He said, ‘‘We can’t touch
that; it’s sacred. Doesn’t matter that there’s a
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war on.’’ There’s another lesson in bureaucracy
that carries into today’s world.
Then came Project Camelot. Now, having
learned a lot about the social sciences from my
friends at IDA, working with Rains Wallace in
OSD, and having Harold Brown’s mandate to
work with the social sciences, I wrote a memo
to the Services that said, ‘‘We want to encourage
this kind of work. Tell us your ideas and we’ll
see what can be worked out.’’
There was an Army FCRC (Federal Con-
tract Research Center) called the Special Opera-
tions Research Office (SORO), whose job was
PsyWar [Psychological Warfare] and things like
that. I had just been to Panama and talked with
General Porter, who was Commander of the
U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM), and
told him that we were starting this program in
the social sciences to learn more about what mo-
tivated people to support rebellion against their
governments, and how to deal with the issues.
He said, ‘‘Well, it’s awfully sensitive to try to
do that kind of research in this area.’’ I said,
‘‘There won’t be any research of this kind going
on in your area without our passing it by you
first and getting your comments.’’
About two months later – in the summer of
1965 – my wife and I had just taken our kids to
camp and we were looking forward to our first
summer by ourselves since the kids were born.
When I got home, I got a call from Colonel Sul-
livan. He was responsible for the Army Re-
search Office’s social science program, among
other things.
He said, ‘‘Have you seen the Washington
Star today?’’ I said, ‘‘No, I haven’t.’’ ‘‘Okay, take
a look.’’ Walter Pincus, who’s still writing for
The Washington Post, had an article about
a State-Defense feud because the newspaper in
Santiago, Chile had published an article saying
‘‘the U.S. Army is planning an invasion of Chile
under the name of Project Camelot.’’ That was
how we learned that people in SORO had con-
tacted some of their friends at the University
in Santiago without letting us know. That blew
Rains’ and my efforts to use the social sciences
to help in counterinsurgency sky high.
Our summer was destroyed because the
State Department made a big play to take over
all overseas research that the Defense Depart-
ment was doing. The media had a ball. They
were playing up the State-Defense feud and
making fun of the social science research.
Congress held hearings. Congressman Dante
Fascell, who headed the House Armed Services
Committee (HASC), called me and some other
people in OSD – from ODDR&E and the Office
of the Assistant Secretary for International Secu-
rity Affairs (ISA) - to testify before his Commit-
tee. It was just a god-awful mess.
BOB SHELDON: What kinds of questions
did they ask you?
SEYMOUR DEITCHMAN: ‘‘Why are you
doing this? Why do you have to?’’ At the time,
H. R. Gross was that day’s curmudgeon on the
HASC. He said, ‘‘Well, what do you guys know
about military things, that you can presume to
try a thing like this?’’ We tried to explain it to
him, and I had commented about having retired
military people working at the organizations
that were supposed to do the work. He said,
‘‘Oh, so you’re taking advantage of the military
guys, huh. I’m glad to see you had sense enough
to consult someone with military knowledge,
but they’re not in the military now.’’ There
was lots of such needling.
Congressman Sensenbrenner, who is still
there and was in those hearings at the time,
led me into a trap. He said, ‘‘I read an article
in this morning’s paper to the effect that women
and children are supplying the Vietcong when
they’re in battle.’’ I said, ‘‘Yes, the guerrillas go
forward and the women and kids bring up their
ammunition and food while they’re up in the
front lines waiting to ambush some of our pa-
trols, or engaged in extended combat.’’ And he
said, ‘‘So, when we’re fighting the Vietcong,
we’re fighting women and children.’’ ‘‘Well,
yes – what choice is there?’’
In fact, we see that happening today when
the insurgents in, say Iraq, or Hamas in the
Gaza Strip deliberately draw fire on women
and children because they understand our chiv-
alry-based rules but they don’t feel bound to
fight by those rules. They see the propaganda
value of that asymmetry for themselves. Al
Qaeda and the Palestinians learned from the
Vietcong.
But I’m digressing. Camelot was a total dis-
aster. The social scientists had a very hard time
of it. Congress kept pressing us to know about
the work in the social sciences. Senator
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Fulbright, when he made his ‘‘arrogance of
power’’ speech, referred to that as an example
of this Defense Department’s arrogance of
power, thinking they were going to do work
outside the ‘‘traditional’’ military concerns.
I offered the State Department money for
them to do some of that kind of research. At
the time, there was a rebellion in Angola, and
the question was, what should be our position
on that. I said I’d transfer the money to them if
they would do the research on how the U.S.
should respond to that. They (their Bureau of In-
telligence and Research) said, ‘‘Oh, heavens,
that would be too sensitive. If it even got out
we were thinking about it, it would be a disas-
ter.’’ This came out further in subsequent hear-
ings, which I’ll mention now, for continuity of
the narrative.
This argument about the social sciences
went on for two or three years. In FY68, Senator
Mansfield attached an amendment to the De-
fense Authorization Bill saying that any research
undertaken by the Department of Defense had
to have a clear and obvious relationship to the
DoD mission. That’s still in effect, if anybody
wants to enforce it – and, of course, the DoD
mission is looking very different these days,
after 9/11. Along the way, Mansfield and Ful-
bright had an argument with Senator Gaylord
Nelson. Nelson said, ‘‘The Defense Department
will tell you this research has to be done. And
if they don’t do it, nobody will do it.’’ But
Fulbright wouldn’t have any of that, nor
would Mansfield, so the Mansfield Amendment
passed. That view of the military mission is inter-
esting in view of current events and the accepted
DoD nation-building efforts in Afghanistan and
Iraq.
Another interesting happening during my
tour in the Pentagon: I had some indications
that Secretary McNamara read the trip reports
that I wrote on return from my trips to Southeast
Asia. The typical trip was that I would spend
two weeks or sometimes three weeks in South-
east Asia, with a week in Vietnam and then
a couple of weeks in Thailand – where ARPA
had a very large field unit, as I will describe in
due course. I would then come back and spend
the day on the beach in Hawaii, probably at Fort
DeRussy where it was quiet, or else outside the
Hilton Hawaiian Village Hotel.
I would talk my trip into a little recording
machine, and when I got back my secretary
would transcribe it and I’d finalize it. I knew it
would go to Harold Brown, and after him
Johnny Foster, and the Director of ARPA – this,
no matter whether I was in OSD or ARPA - and I
had some indications that Secretary McNamara
was seeing those reports.
When I would go to Vietnam, I was always
invited to stay in General Westmoreland’s guest
house, and I would have breakfast with him. I’d
get his views on how the war was shaping up.
On one trip out there, in October, 1967, he
was jubilant because they had just used a new
ammunition called Beehive, which was a fle-
chette–loaded shell [a shell loaded with hundreds
of pointed steel projectiles] that could be shot
out of 105 or 155mm cannon. He said, ‘‘We
caught a Vietcong battalion in enfilade – (mean-
ing they were caught endwise so that the whole
battalion was exposed to the fire). They were ab-
solutely decimated, 100-percent casualties. At
this rate, we’re going to have them negotiating
on our terms by spring.’’ From what I under-
stood of the Vietcong and North Vietnamese
and their willingness to sustain casualties, I just
didn’t believe it.
I didn’t believe it to the extent that I didn’t
even want to put it into my trip report, and I
didn’t, because I knew McNamara would see
it. Then Westmoreland came back and briefed
Congress on the progress of the war, and he said
the same thing there. The next February we had
the Tet Offensive, and that turned the whole
thing around because he had led people to be-
lieve we were about to win it hands-down;
and all of a sudden, they (the enemy) were
a good fighting force. The public asked, ‘‘What
happened?’’ I think that was the turning point
in U.S. support for the war.
After two years working in OSD, I had done
the job that was assigned and the program was
running smoothly. John McLucas had left and
Tom Cheatham, who had been at Grumman
Aircraft, replaced him as the Deputy Director
for Tactical Warfare Programs. Tom wasn’t re-
ally interested in the counterinsurgency. He
spent a lot of time pushing the F-14/ Phoenix
program, which was a clear conflict of interest
because he was from Grumman, builders of
the system. He then said to me ‘‘You’re wasting
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your time on this Vietnam War stuff. Why don’t
you be my speech writer?’’ I said, ‘‘Thanks very
much,’’ and I went back to IDA.
After that, the counterinsurgency work was
pulled out from Tom Cheatham and it was set
up as a separate Deputy DDR&E for Southeast
Asia Matters under Len Sullivan, who was
a good friend at the time. He was a very capable
guy who did a great job running the DoD R&D
program in support of the war effort.
Meantime, back at IDA, I got involved in the
JASON summer study related to the Vietnam
problems. JASON was a group of physicists
and chemists then, the top people in the country,
a self-organizing group that a few young scien-
tists were from time to time invited, by the
JASONs, to join. As an indicator, several of them
eventually won Nobel prizes in physics. The
JASONs had organized themselves to work
with DoD on defense problems. (There’s a book
about their history, by Anne Finkbeiner, called
The JASONS, published by Viking/Penguin
press in 2006.) IDA was their administrative
home at the time, and the way they worked
was to get briefed on defense problems, at two
or three meetings during the Spring, and they
would decide what they wanted to work on
during the summer vacation, at a six-week sum-
mer study. They made some very important
contributions to the national defense.
The JASONs had been deeply troubled by
the whole Vietnam War. Under the leadership
of George Kistiakowsky (who had been President
Eisenhower’s Scientific Advisor, the first to
hold that position), physicist Jerrold Zacharias,
and a well-known economist, Carl Kaysen, they
decided they wanted to see if they could do
some work on the Vietnam War that would help
stop the bombing of North Vietnam. Since I had
just come back to IDA from the Pentagon and
knew a lot about the country’s war effort, I
worked with them.
They got an okay from McNamara to work
on that problem. The idea was to see if we could
close the Ho Chi Minh trail by setting up an
instrumented network including sensors and
attack aircraft to attack the North Vietnamese lo-
gistics trails through Laos so that they couldn’t
support the war in the south. Rather than go
into that effort in detail here (because there’s
been a lot of misinformation around about it),
I’ll just note that I have just had published what
I consider to be the definitive article on it in The
Journal of Military History of July 2008. Why
don’t I just leave that as a reference that de-
scribes the whole operation.
Later on, that plus all the other work I’d
done in OSD got me onto the President’s Science
Advisory Committee’s Vietnam panel. I’ll touch
on that again later. Also, I was on the advisory
panel for the Defense Communications Plan-
ning Group, which was the cover organization
that was implementing what we called at the
time the air-supported anti-infiltration barrier.
Just to make a note for the record though,
the JASONs were very disappointed because
they had hoped that mounting a major attack
on the trail system, according to the system we
designed during that 1966 summer study,
would replace the bombing of the North, but it
didn’t. It augmented it. Also, it wasn’t imple-
mented as planned, because it was supposed
to be a reconnaissance-strike system, but all
the Air Force used it for was reconnaissance,
and they responded with strikes as the aircraft
were available. They didn’t want to dedicate air-
craft to the one effort, and that’s what changed
what the JASONs who worked on the system
had hoped would happen, or at least, kept it
from working as designed, for sure.
Also, part of the system was diverted to
help the Marines besieged at Khe Sanh. I agreed
with Bill McMillan, who at the time was General
Abrams’ scientific advisor, (Abrams had suc-
ceeded Westmorland) that the sensors and the
capabilities would be essential to help avoid an-
other defeat like that which did in the French at
Dien Bien Phu a decade and a half earlier. At
Khe Sanh we did have it as a recce-strike sys-
tem, in part because by coincidence there was
a Marine captain who had visited us during
the summer study, where we told him what
we were working on. He knew, when those sen-
sors arrived, what to do with them, and that
helped turn around the battle. Thus, it was the
air strikes and artillery response that went along
with that that finally caused the North Vietnam-
ese to break off that siege, avoiding a major de-
feat for the exposed Marine force. According to
a later Senate report, it probably saved hun-
dreds or thousands of American lives. All this
didn’t become clear until after the war, however.
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BOB SHELDON: Did the JASON group set
up shop at IDA?
SEYMOUR DEITCHMAN: That was their
administrative home, and IDA furnished meet-
ing places. The Vietnam summer study took
place in a dorm at the University of California,
Santa Barbara, where preserving secrecy was
a continuing headache, while the preliminaries
took place during spring breaks at a girls’ school
in Massachusetts. Now JASON is associated
with MITRE. They left IDA as an administrative
home back in the 1970s, I think.
After the summer study I was asked to go
back into DoD and head Project Agile in ARPA.
Johnny Foster was now DDR&E, and he was the
one who asked me. I don’t remember whether it
was Jack Ruina or Bob Sproull who was head of
ARPA. Charles Herzfeld, who I knew quite well
from my stint in ODDR&E, was deputy director
then, and he became Director about the time I
went into ARPA, in late fall of 1966.
Agile was ARPA’s R&D program focused
on the Vietnam War, started after the Alvarez
Task Group’s work that I described earlier. It
had had a succession of military leaders, and
Johnny and ARPAwanted someone with a civil-
ian engineering background to head it, and I
had just the right background because I’d been
working on the Vietnam problems. Agile had
three field units. It had the Vietnam field unit
that I described earlier. It had a field unit
in Thailand, RDFU-T (for R&D Field Unit,
Thailand), which included about 30 U.S. mili-
tary, 30 Thai military, a large number of U.S.
contractors, and a large secretarial and support
staff. Altogether, that came to a research lab of
about 500 people.
What was done there included R&D on
weapons and surveillance techniques, and
communications techniques to help the war ef-
fort in Vietnam and also with insurgencies in
Thailand’s northeast and northern provinces.
BOB SHELDON: Where were the 500 peo-
ple located? Were they in the DC area?
SEYMOUR DEITCHMAN: No. This field
unit was housed in its own building in Bangkok.
There was another small field unit in Beirut,
Lebanon. Its purpose was, through research, to
try to learn something about the area. That one
had some interesting background. On a visit to
Israel, I got to talk with General Bar Lev, the
Israeli Chief of Staff, after whom the Bar Lev line
defending the Suez border with Egypt was
named. In response to his question I told him
what that field unit was for, and I stressed the
accommodations that had to be made between
the Lebanese Christian and Muslim communi-
ties. His response was, ‘‘What are they worried
about? We’ll protect them,’’ which shows the in-
sensitivity of the Israelis to the subtleties in the
Arab communities that they really needed
(and still need) to be sensitive to.
In another instance, Dr. Herzfeld, when he
was ARPA Director, was testifying before Con-
gressman Mahon, who was head of the House
Appropriations Committee, and dual-hatted,
as head of the Armed Services Appropriations
Subcommittee. Mahon wanted to know why
we had that Lebanon office and Herzfeld said,
‘‘We have to learn something about the area; it
is important to us strategically.’’ Mahon said,
‘‘We have no interest in that area. I think you
ought to stop that.’’ This was in about 1968 or
1969.
BOB SHELDON: This was the Lebanon of-
fice he was talking about?
SEYMOUR DEITCHMAN: Yes. And it fi-
nally got disestablished in about 1970 or so,
soon after I left ARPA.
There was also a low-level insurgency in
Northeast Thailand which had been stimulated,
I think, by the war in Vietnam. The North Viet-
namese had been training the Pathet Lao, who
had taken over half of Laos. They were also
training what came to be called communist ter-
rorists, abbreviated to CT, who would come into
Northeast Thailand and agitate in the villages,
attack police posts, and that sort of thing. We
were also helping the Thai, trying to defeat that
insurgency.
Now, a few of the outstanding things about
Agile. At any time, I think I had 25 or 30 projects
going. I think I’ve already mentioned Agent Or-
ange and the M16 rifle that Agile had done.
They had also put a gunner’s shield on the
M113 armored personnel carrier, which was
the standard infantry vehicle in Vietnam. It
had been built with a machine gun mounted
on top, but no way to protect the gunner and
the other side got onto that very quickly.
They were doing a lot of work with a verti-
cally looking infrared scanner on a B-57 bomber,
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which could pick out Vietcong encampments at
night and things like that. That turned out to be
the forerunner of the forward-looking infrared
sights that we use now. At the time, it wasn’t
used very much because the J2 of MACV felt,
‘‘That’s an R&D thing, and I can’t be bothered
with that. I’ve got a war to fight,’’ which was re-
ally too bad because it could have helped him
fight his war. There would have been an ambi-
guity, though, because you would have to know
where the villages were and be able to separate
them from what were Vietcong encampments
outside in the woods.
Also, there was work on jungle communica-
tion. It turned out that the dense vegetation at
ground level was very absorptive of very high
frequency (VHF) radio waves so patrols or out-
posts under attack couldn’t get a message ask-
ing for help to go very far. Bobby Kennedy,
who was then attorney general, had headed
what John Kennedy had set up as a Special
Group, CI, (for Counter Insurgency). At that
time, we had just gotten our first space shot to
Venus. It was also the beginning of our partici-
pation in the war in Vietnam, and we were hear-
ing about Special Forces camps being overrun
because they couldn’t call for help, because their
VHF communications weren’t working. Bobby
Kennedy famously remarked, ‘‘I don’t under-
stand why you can communicate across 25 mil-
lion miles of space to Venus and you can’t
communicate through 5 miles of jungle.’’
ARPA had started a very large program on
that, and eventually found there was a treetop
mode where the foliage was less dense and
did not absorb all the radio waves. The Special
Forces and other troops who had to be in that
dense vegetation were given a means to shoot
an antenna up into the treetops so they could
communicate. That was a very useful Agile out-
put.
There was work done on vehicles that could
move through rice paddies, and other rough or
furrowed, ploughed terrain. Another problem
was tunnel detection, because there was a whole
network of tunnels underlying the area just out-
side of Saigon where the Vietcong were hiding
and used as supply depots and everything else
a military base can do. They were in Zone C,
which was northwest of Saigon, a very large
area. We found ways that helped detect individ-
ual tunnels, but we could never find enough to
work out the entire network, and that’s what
a lot of the B-52 raids outside of Saigon were
for – simply trying to uproot the whole area
through which the tunnels were laced. There
was also the Rural Security Systems Program
(RSSP) in Thailand that was designed to help
the counterinsurgency in Northeast Thailand.
It was just getting started when I got there.
I continued all these programs that were on-
going when I got to ARPA, and I started some
new ones. One was a quiet aircraft. Now we
have the Predator UAVs [unmanned aerial vehi-
cles], but at that time there was nothing like that.
The Vietcong would make cuts in roads and lay
mines at night, so our forces had to find them. I
said, ‘‘There has to be a way to make a quiet air-
craft.’’
I don’t remember how we got to Lockheed,
but they took a Schweitzer glider and mounted
a muffled Volkswagen engine on it. It had a long
propeller shaft with a very slow-moving propel-
ler out front so you didn’t get the noise-making
shockwaves off the propeller tips. That could fly
at 500 to 1,000 feet altitude and the Vietcong
wouldn’t hear it. From that aircraft, using the
original starlight scopes for low-light level
viewing, we could see them planting the mines,
and then call in the ground forces to either chase
them or at least dig up the mines.
We also extended the work with sensors.
For one, we made up what was called a patrol
seismic intrusion detection system. There were
four small seismic detectors with an enunciator
box, and patrols could put them out around
their bivouac for the night. If anybody was com-
ing in, they would hear them and they could get
ready for them.
I started something that I called Small
Independent Action Forces (SIAF). The com-
plaint had been that the soldiers had a 90-
pound pack and then they were overloaded;
there had to be a way to lighten their load and
make a patrol more efficient. Now we had in
our field units, Brits and Australians working
with us, who had been through fighting insur-
gencies, both in Malaya and in Borneo. They
were very helpful in how to set up a patrol.
What we did was to describe the patrol as a sys-
tem. Their weapons were part of the system,
their communications were part of the system,
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and the observations were parts of the system.
They would all work together just as in ongoing
patrols, but much more effectively and effi-
ciently, while the soldier’s load could be light-
ened considerably.
What we didn’t count on were the human
factors aspects. We lightened the solders’ load
but then they found they were used to carrying
90 pounds. After we lightened the load, they
filled it back up with cans of Coke because that
was quick nourishment in the field. Nobody
was going to give up his gun. They were willing
to have a primary communicator, but they
found they’d better all be cross-trained in how
to use that equipment, and have more than
one set, just in case. And so on. That was about
the state of it when I left ARPA; I know they con-
tinued the work, but I don’t know what it came
to afterwards.
We also found out, through our interna-
tional dealings - I won’t mention the country
because I don’t know if they still have it classi-
fied –a way to make a three-wire barbed wire
fence which, in fact, we could use in our own
southwest now. The wires were attached to sen-
sors on the posts, with the posts maybe 100 feet
apart, and if somebody either tried to stretch
the wire or cut the wire, it wouldn’t matter;
you’d get an indication, and you’d get a readout.
You’d know where that sensor was, so you
could go directly to that spot.
I thought that was interesting enough so I
bought about ten kilometers of it to put along
the fence on the DMZ in Korea. This was where
I learned that taking shortcuts and getting rid of
milspecs doesn’t always work. We put the sen-
sors on the existing fence along the DMZ, but
they were invented in a place that doesn’t have
freezing cold winters. In Korea, everything
froze. The only sensors on the fence that worked
were the tin cans that the South Korean Army
tied up along the fence in bunches because if
anyone disturbed the fence, they would rattle
like hell. You keep learning lessons.
Now for some things for which there was no
service home, like the Rural Security Systems
Program in Thailand. We helped the Thai set
up that system, which included protection for
villages and civic action to help the villages im-
prove their economies by getting pure water,
employing their young men in things like auto
repair, and an evaluation system to know how
it was working.
They first had to get their police and their
military on the same radio wavelengths because
they couldn’t call in help if a village was struck.
Then, they couldn’t detect the CT (communist
terrorists) coming across the river, so we set
up what came to be called ARPA’s Navy, which
was a set of Thai operated patrol boats with ra-
dars. But then we were cautioned by Ambassa-
dor Leonard Unger – a very nice guy who was
very supportive – who said, ‘‘Look, that river
is not a boundary. It’s a highway. The same peo-
ples are on both sides of the highway, and you
can’t disrupt that culture by interdicting normal
traffic across the river or we’ll have even more
trouble.’’ The issue was, how do you do that?
Again, the social sciences came into it.
In another part of the Thailand effort, ARPA
had an anthropologist by the name of Bob
Kickert up in the far northwest provinces of
Thailand. The problem up there was that the hill
tribes would practice slash-and-burn agricul-
ture. What they were slashing and burning
was teak, which was Thailand’s main export.
The idea was to try to get them to do agriculture
in a different way, on fixed fields, and trying to
get the government to help them do that. It
never really succeeded. The government was al-
ways at war with those tribes, but we tried.
For the U.S.-oriented parts of the Agile pro-
gram, I had concluded, finally, that we shouldn’t
start working on anything unless we had ad-
vanced assurance from the Services that they
had established a requirement for it. There was
a lot that we did – same problem I saw from
the DDR&E side – that the Services just wouldn’t
accept. So what was the point? Then Eb Rechtin
(Dr. Eberhardt Rechtin) – independently when
he became director – made that ARPA policy.
We wouldn’t do any work with the Services un-
less they first said they would accept the results if
successful.
The issue came to be, how does our research
affect policy? At least on the social and political
side, not much. I’ve just given the example of
the Thai government with the hill tribes in the
northwest. Another example has more pro-
found implications.
Henry Kissinger was now President Nixon’s
National Security Advisor, and he was trying to
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ease us out of the Vietnam War. Among other
things he pulled back the U.S. Special Forces
who had been working with the Montagnard
tribes in Central Vietnam, and put the ARVN,
the Army of the Republic of Vietnam, in charge
of their units. The Montagnard units were not
reporting to the U.S. Special Forces now, but to
the ARVN. By this time, I was out of the DoD
but I was on the President’s Science Advisory
Committee (PSAC) Vietnam sub-committee. I
sent Kissinger a memorandum, saying ‘‘There
is active hatred between the Montagnard and
the ethnic Vietnamese. If you put the Monta-
gnard under the ARVN, that’s going to end in
a disaster.’’ I never got an answer to it. I know
he got it because I found that out through infor-
mal channels.
But, in fact, that’s where the North Vietnam-
ese broke through and came down to Saigon.
Ban Me Thuot, which had been defended by
the Montagnard, was attacked by the North
Vietnamese and the Montagnard said, ‘‘Well,
hell. We don’t have to defend those ARVN
guys,’’ and they just melted away and the North
Vietnamese came through and reached Saigon
shortly thereafter. So how does research affect
policy? I suspect that by that time, Kissinger
and Nixon had decided we had to leave Viet-
nam, win or lose, so the memo I sent Kissinger,
based on years of research by Gerry Hickey, was
overtaken by events (OBE) before it was written,
let alone sent.
Another example. By this time, Igloo White,
which was the sensor network along the vehicle
part of the Ho Chi Minh trail that had resulted
from the JASON 1966 summer study, was in op-
eration and with Loran D, which was a pretty
accurate navigation system. We found that
a 500-pound bomb landing within the CEP (cir-
cular error probable) of Loran D would destroy
a truck. As part of the PSAC Vietnam Panel I
had recommended that the Air Force, instead
of using 2,000-pound bombs, which were too
big and very expensive, could use 500-pound
bombs and could buy several times as many
for the same price.
John McLucas, who by then was Secretary
of the Air Force, came over to talk to us. I never
challenged him on it, because clearly the Air
Staff was insisting, but he said, ‘‘The Air Force
has no requirement for 500-pound bombs.’’
Again, the requirements process trumped com-
mon sense.
In fairness though, I have to point out that
R&D products do affect policy where the
‘‘powers that be’’ want the results the R&D of-
fers. For example, for all the uncertainties in
the application of the ‘‘electronic battlefield’’
in Laos, it did help win the battle of Khe Sanh
when it was deployed there. General Westmore-
land took advantage of a tool that was presented
to him, although not in the way the inventors of
the tool expected.
I also need to make a comment about being
in ‘‘the system’’, and believing data selectively,
because we see a lot of that happening today.
When I was in ARPA, we engaged a friend
of mine – Alfred Blumstein, who’s a top-notch op-
erations researcher, now at Carnegie Mellon, –
to help us understand the data that we were
getting from Vietnam. He came to me one day
and said – this was about six months after we
had gone in with U.S. combat troops – ‘‘Sy, look
at this data on enemy-initiated incidents. They’ve
recovered from the escalation.’’ I said, ‘‘No, that
can’t be right,’’ and I gave him ten reasons why
that couldn’t be right. But now that I look back
on it, of course, he was right. Which just goes to
show, and I was known as a skeptic in the DoD
system, that you get captured by it. We see that
kind of thing happening today in many parts of
the government, especially with respect to the
wars we are in.
In the fall of 1969, I felt I had done what I
could and I left ARPA and returned to IDA. That
was after a more extensive job search because I
figured with all the people I knew in the defense
industry, and my reputation, I could write my
own ticket. In fact, I got job offers with a lot more
money doing very specialized things; for exam-
ple I was offered the presidency of a company
making surveillance equipment. In the end, I
decided, no, I’d rather be doing analytical work
‘‘close to the throne’’. I went back to IDA, in fact
at a pay cut, because Al Flax who was then pres-
ident of IDA, was making sure it didn’t look like
they were luring me away from the Defense De-
partment.
At the time, there was generally a lot of ag-
itation against the Defense Department because
of the Vietnam War, and there was a feeling
among some of the staff in IDA, that, ‘‘Hey, we
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need to work on civilian things. All we do is
war, and this is no good.’’ Al Flax asked me to
take over an office of civil programs that he
had just set up, and help build up that office.
They were working mainly with the Depart-
ment of Transportation on mass transit, and
were looking at high-speed rail for the North-
east Corridor. They were also trying to start
work on environmental issues, like pollution
control, especially water pollution. They had
a contract with Post Office department helping
them evaluate mail-sorting machines.
As an aside, we showed the Post Office that
the very fancy letter-processing machine they
were thinking about buying would not be cost
effective, and that they were doing fine with
what they had and ought to have stayed with
it. The Assistant Postmaster General for R&D
at the time didn’t like that answer. He cancelled
the contract. This raises the question again: does
research affect policy?
As another bit of trivia, we also made a pro-
posal on reducing energy use to the predecessor
of what’s now the Department of Energy. They
were incredulous that we were assuming oil
was going to reach $20 a barrel. This was 1969-
1970, when it was $10 a barrel or less. They
wouldn’t even consider our proposal, because
they thought that with assumptions like that
we weren’t smart enough to do the work we
were proposing to do.
I also learned some interesting things about
Japan’s high-speed train in the process. They
didn’t have an existing infrastructure to build on,
so they built their whole system from scratch –
the tracks, the cars, the wheel trucks to suit the
new track gauge they concluded they needed,
and the kite or trapeze (I’m not sure of the right
word for it) that rides the overhead rail for the
electric power. The whole thing was built as a to-
tal system. I realized that we in the U.S. were
handicapped by having an existing infrastruc-
ture because what we were trying to do in this
country was to use the Pennsylvania/New York
Central railroad tracks to run a high-speed rail
system between Washington and Boston. And
the rail bed was just not up to it. In fact, it’s only
now 40 years later that we started the Acela Ex-
press train, and it’s still not as good or as fast as
Japan’s train, or even Europe’s high speed rail-
ways for that matter.
I had another interesting interaction in the
civil work, where we contacted the FAA. Al Flax
and I both knew Dave Israel from Lincoln Lab,
where he had been very active in air defense.
He had become Chief Scientist at the Defense
Communications Planning Group, which worked
on the anti-infiltration barrier and from there he
had become Assistant Administrator of the FAA
for R&D in the early 1970s.
Al and I went to talk to him about undertak-
ing a study on how to transition from what was
then the grid-like map on the ground that the
airways were following, from one vertically
broadcasting radio beam to the next, to a direct
origin-to-destination navigation system be-
cause that technology was just beginning to
come in.
We were doing a study at IDA on NAVSTAR
(Navigation Satellite Timing & Ranging), which
became what today we know as the Global
Positioning System (GPS). There was also a sys-
tem around, whose name I forget, that was
a point-to-point navigation system just put out
by Sperry. We said, ‘‘It’s time to look at how
would we implement such a system?’’ Dave
Israel said, ‘‘Look, I’ve been brought here to
implement the Alexander report. I’m not going
to touch anything that goes beyond that.’’
He was referring to Ben Alexander who was a
well-known systems engineer. His report, after
a committee he chaired, assessed the air traffic
control system and recommended putting tran-
sponder beacons on airplanes so that their radar
returns could be tracked more easily, but made
no fundamental changes in the airway system.
That set air traffic control back probably 10 to
20 years at least, and it’s another good example
of someone being captured by ‘‘the system.’’
We’re just beginning now to get caught up with
the GPS technology in air traffic control, and
that was stimulated by the successful use of
GPS in the 1991 Gulf War, indicating how long
it takes to adopt a new technology for peacetime
applications.
But we did get a contract to explore mid-air
collision avoidance systems. I had a long-term
interest in that from the days when we were
working with the FAA at CAL. In fact, I had
published a paper on mid-air collision avoid-
ance in which I demonstrated that you could
avoid collisions by one airplane going up and
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the other one down if they were on a collision
course, but there was no way they could be sure
they wouldn’t get on another collision course if
they changed the two aircraft tracks with hori-
zontal maneuvers.
BOB SHELDON: Did that evolve into
TCAS?
SEYMOUR DEITCHMAN: Yes. The IDA
team evaluated several mid-air collision avoid-
ance systems that the FAA was thinking about,
and the work ably done by Jim Bagnall and
Bob Turner helped the FAA decide that they
would authorize TCAS - the current Traffic
Alert and Collision Avoidance System.
The final result of the civil program work
was that I concluded that a Federal Contract
Research Center (FCRC) like IDA couldn’t com-
pete. The staff had a different mindset. It didn’t
know how to prepare a winning proposal. Our
cost structure was wrong because the overhead
didn’t allow for preparing proposals, and we
couldn’t stand the expense. There was no profit
stream to absorb it. I recommended to Al Flax
that we just drop it, and the ongoing projects
were just absorbed into the divisions’ work pro-
grams as we had them at the time.
I realized subsequently that Al probably
knew all that, but that was his way of putting
me on ice for two years because there was no
way I could work at IDA on defense work with-
out interacting with people that I had worked
with in the DoD.
BOB SHELDON: So IDA stayed primarily
with defense work?
SEYMOUR DEITCHMAN: Yes. There was
still a trickle of work for civilian agencies, par-
ticularly continuing the FAA work for a while,
but mainly, IDA worked for defense agencies –
and mainly for OSD or defense-wide agencies,
because we couldn’t work for the Services when
much of our business was evaluating service
systems and activities.
To recap, Al Flax had put me on ice for two
years in terms of dealing with the DoD, by ask-
ing me to head the Office of Civil Programs. At
the time, because of the agitation about the Viet-
nam War, people were wanting to get into civil
programs with less concentration on warfare
programs. After two years, I had concluded that
IDA was not going to be able to compete in that
environment. Its structure was not constituted
for competition, especially with commercial
firms, so the office was disestablished.
BOB SHELDON: Explain again the reasons
it wasn’t competitive with commercial firms.
SEYMOUR DEITCHMAN: The overhead
structure was wrong. We didn’t have a profit
structure where we could put profits into pre-
paring proposals. The people didn’t know
how to prepare proposals that would compete
in the commercial area because IDA was a pro-
tected organization; it had been working for
the government and was paid by the govern-
ment. But there was some civil work as I de-
scribed previously.
About 1972, I was appointed Assistant Vice
President for Research. Al Flax had held the
Vice President for Research responsibility in ad-
dition to being President and Chief Executive
Officer (CEO) of IDA.
My responsibility was to oversee the quality
of the research program and help get it orga-
nized; I dealt with sponsor relations and
reported on those things to Al Flax and the
Board of Trustees of IDA.
I later became Vice President for Planning and
Evaluation and continued the same kind of work.
Then under retired General Andrew Goodpaster,
former NATO commander who became President
in about 1982, I became the Vice President for Pro-
grams with the same responsibilities, except now
the division directors reported to me rather than
directly to Andy Goodpaster, the CEO. And ex-
plicitly, he assigned me the full powers of the
CEO at the times when he was absent.
Then in about 1984-85, General Goodpaster
retired from the CEO position, and retired
General William Y. Smith took over. He had
been Deputy Commander-in-Chief Europe
(DCINCEUR) under Andy Goodpaster when
Goodpaster was Supreme Allied Commander
Europe (SACEUR), and the Trustees elected him
to be President and CEO. We then reverted back
to the previous mode with the division directors
reporting directly to him rather than to me. But
all through it, I essentially operated in pretty much
the same way. There wasn’t a lot of difference in
how I functioned through all those management
changes.
BOB SHELDON: Tell me about some of the
research programs you had under you and how
you impacted them.
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SEYMOUR DEITCHMAN: I’m going
to get into that. But first, I want to cover some
management innovations that I’d instituted.
Throughout this interview, I have separated
management from substance because I think
it’s easier to cover all of it that way, without
rambling.
When I came back to IDA I found a steering
committee operating, which included the divi-
sion directors and the corporate management.
It met every week on Monday morning, and
the division directors reported on task orders
pending, other management actions that had
to be taken or were pending, and the outcomes
of management actions that had been taken. So
that minimized surprises. In fact, it’s an ap-
proach I’d recommend for the federal govern-
ment’s cabinet secretaries and the President of
the U.S. right now, if they don’t do something
like that.
Another responsibility was riding herd on
report reviews. There were three levels of re-
ports: papers, studies, and full reports. Every
one of them was reviewed at a level determined
by the level of the report, and then released by
management. Papers were reviewed within the
divisions and could be released by division
directors. Studies were in between, usually
reviewed from outside the division, but a divi-
sion director or the Vice President could release
them. Full reports could be released only by the
President, and they had to be reviewed by people
from outside the division that wrote them. If they
were inter-divisional studies, then we might get
reviewers from outside IDA. The President re-
leased them, usually after I reviewed them and
recommended release. There weren’t many full
reports because those were reporting on big ef-
forts, and I’ll describe some of those shortly. I also
reviewed some of the lower-level reports. I sam-
pled them as a quality control check.
I also found that the semi-annual briefings
for the Board of Trustees led to a sharpening
of projects because for the ones we had to brief
to the Board, we reviewed in advance and we
made sure that they weren’t going to cause the
Board to say, ‘‘What are you guys doing here?’’
BOB SHELDON: How many people were
employed by IDA at the time?
SEYMOUR DEITCHMAN: It was a total of
about 500 people, with a professional staff of
about 200 or 300. A large fraction of those had
PhDs and masters degrees.
BOB SHELDON: When you say a division,
about how many people were in a division?
SEYMOUR DEITCHMAN: Twenty to 30,
maybe 40. It depended on which division. There
were six divisions. We reorganized after Andy
Goodpaster came in; he and I put our heads
together and decided external conditions
demanded a reorganization of the place. After
that, as I recall, there were four divisions, a cost
analysis group, and the computer group that
was responsible for operating our large main-
frame computer.
There was also a lot of Congressional pres-
sure on FCRCs, that later came to be called
FFRDCs, Federally Funded R&D Centers. Those
were IDA, Center for Naval Analyses (CNA),
Research Analysis Corporation (RAC), MITRE,
Analytic Services (ANSER), and the Aerospace
Corporation. This pressure had come about be-
cause Congress was unhappy with some of the
FCRC behaviors – because as they said, ‘‘You
people want to act as though you have a lot of
profit to put into these things when we’re pro-
tecting you and guaranteeing your income.’’
There were two particular examples that they
kept coming back to. One was Ivan Getting’s
boat. Ivan Getting was President of Aerospace
Corporation. When he moved from the East
Coast to take over that presidency, he had a large
boat to ship between the coasts, and shipping it
cost about $3,000, which he charged to over-
head. The other example was that IDA invited
Elliott Montroll, who was at the IBM Thomas
J. Watson Research Center in Yorktown Heights,
New York at that time, to be Vice President for
Research. Montroll was very well-known for
his operations research work on ground traffic
control, and things like that. IDA had helped
him sell his house and buy a new house in
Chevy Chase, Maryland. At that time, it was
an expensive house. I think it cost about
$200,000 or $250,000, so that would be an order
of magnitude higher in cost now.
Congress said, ‘‘You guys can’t do this.
You’re a protected organization and you can’t
act as though you’re profit-making.’’ As part
of my duties I always had to help DDR&E jus-
tify our existence. This led to what came to be
what I called, the Gabriel File. I called it that
MORS ORAL HISTORY PROJECT . . . MR. SEYMOUR J. DEITCHMAN
Page 84 Military Operations Research, V15 N2 2010
because we used to do something like that in
ARPA when I was there. The name was coined
because we were like the angel, Gabriel, blow-
ing our own horn. It was our brag sheet because
we didn’t have a bottom line to show, so we had
to have some way of showing that our organiza-
tion was doing some good.
‘‘Was our work being used?’’ was the issue
for evaluation. The criteria were that we needed
independent evidence of utilization. For exam-
ple, if we could find a Congressional Report or
similar, that said, ‘‘IDA recommends the follow-
ing changes in the Airborne Warning and Con-
trol System (AWACS) and the Air Force needs
to implement them’’ or some such thing, and
then we could show that the Air Force did it,
that could be a claim of influence by our work.
That indicator applied to about 30 percent of
the work that we did. It was up to the divisions
to gather the data, project by project, and show
us at the end of each year whether their work
was being used and how it was being used.
I also introduced the idea of what came to
be called Psi graphs. The division directors used
the play on words between Psi and Sy, some-
what in derision, because these graphs gave
them a headache every month. IDA’s divisions
had become rather lax about the money and
on-time performance of tasks and this was caus-
ing management problems with our sponsors in
ODDR&E. Each month I wanted each project to
plot money versus time on a linear graph, and I
wanted one sentence on the status as well as the
percentage complete so that I could track it. If
money spent departed from the straight-line
graph or there wasn’t progress and they had
spent money, then I could raise the question
‘‘What’s happening?’’ It was a very useful man-
agement tool.
Also, we found working with Lieutenant
General Glenn Kent, who was Director of
WSEG, an altogether interesting, strengthening,
and searing experience. The staff never got used
to his style. He’d get hung up on a word. For
example, ‘‘analysis’’ instead of ‘‘evaluation.’’
Someone briefing him on a WSEG project would
say evaluation and he’d say, ‘‘No. You should
have said analysis.’’ Or in a briefing, graphs
should be plotted one way rather than another.
I kept trying to tell them, ‘‘Grant him the point,’’
but no, they kept arguing. These reviews of
WSEG projects would take forever; in retrospect
I can only call those reviews nit-picky. But, as I
said, it was a style, and it had a purpose. It
was his way of getting the analysts to think care-
fully about what they were saying, and to avoid
sloppy or confusing language when talking to
the DoD.
A lot of time and adrenaline was spent at
IDA discussing how to deal with General Kent.
I noticed that this was discussed by General
Larry Welch in his oral history. What it amounted
to was that Kent’s style stressed the importance
of how language is used in setting up and con-
veying analytical results. That really was quite
important. But at the time, the frustration of ar-
guing with him overrode that lesson for the
IDA staff. I never could get it across to them.
I want to comment on the value of WSEG.
We had a division set up especially to work with
them, which meant that projects were worked
on jointly in an integrated way by military and
civilian analysts. That meant the military point
of view was deeply embedded within the proj-
ect and the military people absorbed the analyt-
ical point of view. It was a unique product, and
it’s never been duplicated anywhere. It was re-
ally too bad that WSEG was disbanded in the
late 1970s for many bureaucratic reasons within
the Joint Chiefs of Staff ( JCS). I think something
important was lost in their loss.
The last management thing I want to com-
ment on was General Goodpaster’s definition
of ‘‘strategy.’’ He said,‘‘A strategy is defined
by three questions: ‘‘What do you want to do?
How do you want to do it? With what?’’ Period.
I have always thought that was elegant, simple,
and it applies to any situation. I think of it in
terms currently used, of the so-called ‘‘surge
strategy’’ in Iraq. People call that a strategy,
but it really deals only with the ‘‘with what.’’
Nobody ever really articulated ‘‘what do you
want to do’’, or ‘‘how do you want to do it’’.
All they talk about is the ‘‘with what’’. I noticed
that’s going on in this election campaign (2008)
and the arguments about how the war is going.
[And, post-script – it seems to be going on in
part in the Obama Administration’s review of
Afghan War policy. The main arguments are
about whether to add more troops, and people
in Congress and the media say ‘‘we need a strat-
egy first,’’ when they mean we need to resolve
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the questions of objectives and how to achieve
them. But I have the feeling, from comments
in the media and by the President himself, that
the President is indeed following the Good-
paster definition in working out a war strategy
for Afghanistan.]
Now the technical highlights. After I talk
about several aspects of IDA’s work, I’ll talk
about personal work I was doing on various ad-
visory groups. Remember, too, that IDA had
several dozen projects going at any one time,
so what I will mention includes a selection of
memorable events and outcomes from a long
list of work that was always under way.
First, modeling and simulation. Jerry
Bracken and Bruce Anderson at IDA built the
TACWAR [Tactical Warfare] simulation model.
It gradually evolved and became a standard
simulation that I think is still used in analyses
of conventional warfare. They did a magnificent
job in getting that model on line and in use.
There was, however, great reluctance on the
part of the staff to test the models and simula-
tions against real life. For example, I was after
them to test it against the Israeli Sinai cam-
paigns because those were classic campaigns
on which there was a lot of data, and TACWAR
exactly fit that kind of conflict - two armies
facing off. There was a forward line of own
forces and breakthroughs of the enemy lines,
just exactly what TACWAR was designed to
look for.
We may have done such a test, after all. I
can’t remember. But it was very difficult to get
the simulation model builders to think along
those lines – basically, they didn’t want to, and
I never figured out the reason why. Maybe they
were afraid the model would show up as not be-
ing quite adequate.
At the same time, we were asked by the
Joint Chiefs to evaluate the performance of
U.S. systems in foreign military operations. That
led us to gather histories of conflicts that had
just passed, like some of the Sinai campaigns
and the Falklands War. Just to comment on
some of the main results of interest in these eval-
uations: We found that tank kills that were
claimed for infantry weapons and air-to-ground
weapons in desert war had been greatly exag-
gerated. If someone shot at a tank, he said he
killed it. But the data from film showed, ‘‘No,
it wasn’t killed – it kept on maneuvering,’’ and
things like that.
In the Falklands War, it was found that
tracers in anti-aircraft fire were very important
in keeping aircraft away from the ship targets.
It spoiled the pilots’ aim by making them aware
that they were being shot at and knowing where
the shots were headed. Also, command and
control in the Falklands War was exercised by
Margaret Thatcher personally. The fact of com-
munications between the fleet in the South At-
lantic and London led to problems, because
when ships’ communications antennas were
turned towards London for communication,
they were losing radar visibility in the direction
the threat was coming from. So that was an im-
portant factor in ship losses in that conflict. That
conflict also showed the importance of keeping
intermediate bases for long-distance deploy-
ment. For example, for the Brits to get to the
Falklands, Ascension Island was absolutely es-
sential. If they didn’t have that base, they
couldn’t have gotten there.
In another area IDA had worked with
WSEG and the Services on air combat testing.
There were two programs, Air Intercept Missile
Evaluation (AIMVAL) and Air Combat Evalua-
tion (ACEVAL), which, respectively, tested dif-
ferent angles for off bore-sight air-to-air
missile guidance, and multi-formation combat
from one-on-one to four-on-four in different
combinations.
Because the Navy and USAF both partici-
pated, it was F-14s and F-15s against F-5s, which
were used to simulate the MIG-21 threat air-
craft. The Air Force and the Navy simply didn’t
want to accept the low exchange ratios they
were getting because of the tactics they were us-
ing. I don’t want to describe the tactics here be-
cause I’m not sure whether both the U.S. tactics
and the tactics that the threat used have been
declassified yet.
But what the outcomes of the tests showed
was the importance of having off-boresight
air-to-air missiles. They also showed that ma-
neuvering and guns remained important for
close-in engagements. The Air Force had been
wanting to take the guns off the aircraft, and
that would have been a great mistake.
BOB SHELDON: Let me back up to your
historical analyses. Did you compare notes with
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the Trevor Dupuy Institute when they were
gathering similar data for the Army?
SEYMOUR DEITCHMAN: Yes. In fact, at
the time, Trevor was working for IDA, I believe,
in one of the divisions, or at least he had worked
for IDA just before that. But anyway, we main-
tained a connection with him. And if anything,
he helped contribute to those histories.
There was also an interesting lesson on be-
ing cautious in making judgments about new
systems. There was an IDA study for DoD
of a new USAF proposal for what they called
NAVSTAR at the time. It’s what became GPS.
We found – the report said – that other methods
of navigation, like Loran C and D, already
existed that were just as accurate as NAVSTAR
was then projected to be. Therefore, we didn’t
need this expensive new system. That was the
conclusion of the report.
What we didn’t foresee were the potential
other uses for the system, like weapon guid-
ance, and the drastically lowered cost of GPS
as it proliferated into the civilian economy.
Not only were there more military applications
than we had foreseen, but extensive civilian use
as well, as in air traffic control and civilian avi-
ation navigation, as well as the personal uses
that are now appearing, as in automobile navi-
gation systems. We were just dead wrong in that
because we couldn’t see far enough ahead and
didn’t see enough of the potential other uses
for that kind of navigation system. That just
says, be cautious when you make judgments
about brand-new system concepts; caveat your
results.
I retired in 1988 from the vice presidency of
IDA. I had to retire, because under ERISA (the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act) a cor-
porate officer could be required to retire even
though employees generally couldn’t. But I was
ready, and the reason was that I was finding that
my memory wasn’t as good as I wanted it to be
for effective management. In earlier years I could
retain in my head, conversations from months
ago and would know exactly who said what,
and I would know my calendar for a month in
advance or more. As I was getting older (and
by then I had reached age 65), I couldn’t do that
any more. I noticed that the division directors
would often say to me ‘‘but you said ..’’ and I
couldn’t remember what I said to confirm in
my own mind that they were right. So no matter
what ERISA said, I had felt it was time for me to
retire from management.
I did stay on at IDA as part-time researcher,
and I’ll come back to some of what I did then.
But first I want to mention a backhanded com-
pliment that I got for IDA. It was a compliment
via a complaint, and it just shows the integrity of
the organization and how we had been running
it, and that’s why I want to mention it. Chuck
Bernard was then the Deputy Director for
DoD Tactical Warfare Programs (DDTWP) for
land warfare programs. He was the brother-in-
law of Tony Battista, who happened to be
a much-feared staff chief of the House Armed
Services Committee during the 1980s. He didn’t
mind going into the Defense budget and chang-
ing it unilaterally, line-by-line, and then writing
a report saying, ‘‘You must do this,’’ and the
committee backed him up. (I don’t remember
who was chair of the committee at the time.)
As an example of what had happened in that
kind of environment – Jim Wade and Chuck
Bernard came into ODDR&E together. Jim
Wade was the principal Deputy DDR&E. The
two of them put their heads together and over-
turned NATO’s whole air defense structure just
after it had been finally decided after years of
negotiation among the nations.
Part of that scheme was a line of defenses
along the eastern border. Chuck and Jim devel-
oped a scheme that involved the Missile Exper-
imental (MX) Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
(ICBM) first stage, which was supposed to be
loaded with runway-busting sub-munitions, to
be launched from West Germany against the So-
viet Bloc airfields in the east if they launched the
expected air attack on NATO as their opening
gambit. That MX launch would break up the air-
fields and the Soviet Air Force would be put out
of commission after its initial sortie because the
missile would be launched during their attack
and they would have no bases to come back
to. In addition, instead of Hawk, which had fi-
nally been decided was to be the main air de-
fense missile along NATO’s eastern defense
line, Wade and Bernard wanted to introduce
a ground-based version of AMRAAM, the Ad-
vanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile,
which was just being introduced at the time
but is now standard in the USAF.
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I thought it was inappropriate to introduce
that scheme just after NATO had spent decades
agreeing on the existing air defense plan. But,
much to my horror, they asked IDA to look at
the cost effectiveness of their proposed system.
And we did. Among many conclusions, one
was that the Germans would never allow an
MX first stage to be launched from their terri-
tory, because it would look like a branch of the
U.S. strategic forces. Another was that cruise
missiles with runway-busting sub-munitions
would be more cost effective than the MX first
stage in taking out the East German airfields
anyway. We stuck to that and had many argu-
ments with Chuck Bernard about it.
That’s background. When I was leaving the
vice presidency in 1988, I was going around say-
ing goodbye to all the people we’d worked with,
and I talked to Chuck. He said, ‘‘You guys drive
me crazy. I could go to any beltway bandit and tell
them what I wanted in a study and they’d come
up with the answer I was looking for. And you
blank-blank-blanks, I couldn’t budge you an inch
once you reached your conclusions.’’ From the
way he said it, I think he secretly harbored a great
admiration for that quality. I took that to be one of
the greatest compliments IDA had ever had.
BOB SHELDON: When was that MX
analysis?
SEYMOUR DEITCHMAN: They were in
office about four years. I retired in 1988 so it
was like the 1984 timeframe.
Now I’ll come to my work outside of IDA.
Dr. Eb Rechtin, who had been Director of
ARPA after Charlie Herzfeld, eventually be-
came Principal Deputy DDR&E. After Rechtin
moved up to ODDR&E he was the U.S. member
of the NATO Defense Research Group, which
essentially tried to coordinate R&D among all
the NATO nations.
About 1970, he asked me to help start
a NATO panel on operations research under
the DRG (Defence Research Group of NATO).
The first question it was going to examine was
the perennial one during the Cold War: Can
NATO technological superiority overcome War-
saw Pact mass? The answer was, ‘‘Yes, but .’’
We got a lot of interesting results along the
way that I’ll comment on now.
But let me first follow the pattern I’ve estab-
lished in this oral history – I’ll deal with the bu-
reaucratics first. The first thing to talk about, vis-
a`-vis NATO, is that it is a bureaucracy to end all
bureaucracies. I’m sure it still is, but the point is
there were people there who had nothing to do
but be bureaucratic. It was very difficult to get
nations to share information, so you had work-
ing groups galore and they’d share little bits at
a time and they’d meet regularly. In a sense, it
was a way of keeping the alliance together, but
it also turned into a way of stopping anything
from happening.
BOB SHELDON: Did you work on a panel
called AGARD (NATO Advisory Group for
Aeronautical Research and Development)?
SEYMOUR DEITCHMAN: Yes. I’m going
to comment on that later. I went to the first meet-
ing of a new panel called DRG Panel 7, on the
applications of what NATO called operational
research. The staff director of the panel, a French
official by the name of Pierre Naslin, with whom
I became quite good friends, said, ‘‘Okay. Let’s
sit down and set up your working groups, etcet-
era.’’ I declined, and he was shocked.
I had the Defense Science Board (DSB)
model in mind and I said, ‘‘We should just do
studies with the people at hand on the Panel,
plus others who the people at hand might bring
in. And when the study’s finished, we disband
and we go on to the next study.’’ He said that
was unique in NATO experience. He’d never
heard of that approach, but he went along with
it. He later agreed with me that it was an effec-
tive way to work.
BOB SHELDON: Why was that more effec-
tive than the working group model?
SEYMOUR DEITCHMAN: The working
groups tended to get set in their ways and meet
for the sake of meeting. They’d have an estab-
lished agenda and they would come back and
keep working on that same agenda. They
might not ever finish a study because they
would just go on forever working on the same
question. Every time there was a meeting, that
study would come up and they’d talk about
it some more and then go away. In the way I
had proposed, we would start a study, we’d
finish it, write our report, and go onto the next
one, which might very well involve different
people. I think it was a lot more effective,
and certainly more responsive to the questions
asked.
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BOB SHELDON: Did you have to travel to
Brussels for most of your NATO meetings?
SEYMOUR DEITCHMAN: All of them, ex-
cept for a couple we had in places like the
SHAPE (Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers
in Europe) Technical Center (STC) in The Hague,
Netherlands. Most of the work on these studies
was done by the U.S. and U.K. It involved
myself and Wilbur Payne, who was a famous
U.S. name in operations research. He was then
Deputy Under Secretary of the Army for Opera-
tions Research, as a matter of fact (and while we
were working together he left that spot and be-
came head of analysis at the Army’s White
Sands Proving Ground) and Douglas Andrews
of DOAE for the U.K. DOAE was Britain’s
Defense Operational Analysis Establishment,
which was privatized and renamed under
Margaret Thatcher. I don’t remember the name
of the new setup.
There were some inputs by the STC, and oc-
casionally by Germany and their use of the IABG
(Industrieanlagen-Betriebsgesellschaft GmbH).
IAGB was Germany’s analog of IDA. Panel 7
met twice a year and reviewed inputs and re-
sults, so it was a group effort because we passed
the reports around via the NATO system and
then received and incorporated everyone’s com-
ments at the semiannual meetings.
Also, we drew on work that was done in our
home countries and organizations, and used re-
sources like our modeling and simulation capa-
bility at IDA, when corporate money could be
set aside as internal research money for such
purposes. Before I discuss some substantive re-
sults, let me comment on how I like to work on
such problems. I like to use simple models
based on simple equations or sums and differ-
ences, like combining sorties per day and
weapons per sortie and CEP variations as pa-
rameters; things I could put on an Excel spread-
sheet and treat as parametric studies, because I
found that was the best way of learning about
important variables.
While at IDA, I could steal time working
with TACWAR. I always had a staff assistant
who had helped gather the data for the psi
graphs and analyses of IDA’s program perfor-
mance. First it was Anita Shriner, who eventu-
ally moved to China Lake, and then Evelynn
Putnam, who was fluent in Russian and had
a mathematics background. They welcomed
the break away from the administrative kinds
of work.
The U.S. and U.K. studies agreed on the rel-
ative cost-effectiveness of the different kinds
of weapons, but TACWAR showed that much
more force would be needed to stop the canon-
ical Warsaw Pact assault than the U.K.’s battle
group model, so the issue became ‘‘Why?’’ We
spent a day with Wilbur Payne at his White
Sands headquarters, with me on the telephone
to Washington and Doug on the phone to
London, having our respective modelers running
the simulation models as we changed parameters
in real time to find out what was happening.
Finally we found that the answer was in the
implicit assumptions about how we use the
Army. The Brits had the new Chobham armor,
which is essentially a layered armor and very ef-
fective. They would dig their tanks into hull def-
ilade, so nothing was showing but the top of the
turret and the gun. In their battle group model,
the attacking Soviet forces would come through
and the virtually invulnerable tanks would just
keep taking pot shots at them. That was the Brit-
ish model. In the U.S. model, the armor is held
back in reserve, and when the enemy starts
coming through, the reserve armor counterat-
tacks, so that the real parameter of concern got
to be how long was the exposure of our tanks
to enemy fire? It turned out in the models that
the Brits were essentially having a turkey shoot,
so their forces were much more cost effective
than ours were, and that’s why it required so
much more force on our part, because we would
be losing tanks depending on the percent of
time the tanks were exposed to enemy fire. Sub-
sequently, we spent a lot of time trying to track
back through field exercises to see what percent
of the time tanks actually have been exposed to
enemy fire. We never got any good results. Ap-
proximately 25 percent of the time was the best
we could arrive at, but that made a big differ-
ence in the results from our models.
What this exercise really showed was the
importance of running more than one model,
because the differences between their results
help to bring out the models’ implicit assump-
tions and their implications for the results.
I got started, also in this same set of studies,
at looking at TACAIR (Tactical Airpower)
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effectiveness, accuracy and costs. That was the
beginning of a long period of study that I did
in that area that I’ll summarize briefly here to
maintain the continuity of the narrative. I car-
ried these studies on at IDA under various
tasks, past the time I was in the NATO DRG
Panel 7.
The results of the Panel 7 studies and sev-
eral analyses I did afterwards, even through
the period after I had retired from the vice pres-
idency of IDA, showed that it is more important
to work on key elements of what we now call
precision engagement, including accurate target
acquisition and precision weapon system guid-
ance. Doing that is more cost-effective than
working on the design of the weapons them-
selves, and more important even than advanc-
ing the platforms, in the long run.
It showed that the driving cost factor was
aircraft attrition because when you lose an air-
craft, it’s a huge cost that overwhelms the added
cost of precision target acquisition and weap-
onry. Precision weapons and standoff weapons
that could strike with precision from standoff
distances that greatly reduced aircraft attrition
were much more cost-effective than improved
bombing systems for close-in attack, or even im-
proving the attack capability of the aircraft
themselves. It also showed the importance of
using precision weaponry and standoff to take
out the defenses before attacking targets of high
tactical or strategic value, and to allow close air
support aircraft to close with the enemy in di-
rect support of ground forces.
The Air Force was resistant to the idea be-
cause they were focused on weapon costs.
We’d say, ‘‘Well, this guided weapon is going
to make your total system much more cost-
effective.’’ And they’d say, ‘‘I can’t afford that
laser-guided bomb. It costs too much,’’ Even
though that bomb would save aircraft by requir-
ing fewer sorties to kill a target, thus reducing
the huge cost factor of aircraft attrition. They
were comparing the $40,000 for a laser-guided
bomb with the $3,000 for a dumb bomb. But that
was not the comparison to make. I never could
persuade them until they got the GPS-guided
Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM), and that
brought the cost of a guided bomb down
enough that they were willing now to take on
precision weaponry.
There’s an interesting case study. I com-
mented earlier that I wasn’t sure that studies
and advancing technology affect policy. This is
a clear case where the studies didn’t have a lot
of effect but the technological advance did, be-
cause that advance made the guided weapons
cheap enough so that the Air Force would buy
them in quantity. They responded not really to
logical analysis, but to the advance of technol-
ogy.
Another result of the Panel 7 work was
a fallout from the work on the, ‘‘Can technology
beat mass?’’ question. We looked at imple-
mentation costs of all measures, including
the advanced armor, and improved TACAIR
weapons and aircraft, and concluded that the
results we foresaw could be achieved with
about a three percent increase in NATO defense
budgets. That was in one of our reports.
I couldn’t trace it directly, but to me it was
an interesting coincidence that when Jimmy
Carter became President and Harold Brown
was his Secretary of Defense, a few months later
Carter called for a three percent increase in the
NATO defense budgets. Bob Komer was Assis-
tant Secretary for International Security Affairs
at that time, and I knew him quite well from
our interactions when he headed the pacifica-
tion program in Vietnam. I asked him whether
the President’s three percent budget proposal
was our Panel 7 three percent, and whether
the Panel 7 report was where they got it from.
He said, ‘‘Sy, you could never prove it, but prob-
ably.’’ So there’s an example in the other direc-
tion.
Also, closely allied with the Panel 7 work,
Al Flax asked me to complete an AGARD re-
port, looking ahead 20 years to where aerospace
technology was going. The study had been done
but the leader dropped out due to illness, and Al
Flax was the U.S. member and chair of AGARD
at the time. As an incidental observation, that
was the position Von Karman, the father of
modern aeronautical engineering, held first, so
it was a position of great honor. Al certainly de-
served it for his professional contribution to
three-dimensional flutter theory and a lot of
other theoretical aspects of aeroelasticity.
The AGARD panel had looked at space and
aeronautical systems, and the panel’s results led
to the clear conclusion – and that’s the way I
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wrote the report – that the future of aviation and
space lay in information technology: target
acquisition, weapon guidance, command and
control, space communications, and observation
from space. But it also pointed to where aeronau-
tics was going, including unmanned aircraft.
BOB SHELDON: When did you write that?
SEYMOUR DEITCHMAN: I was still deal-
ing with Panel 7, so it probably was before Andy
Goodpaster became President of IDA, around
1980.
It also showed there was no easy way to
overcome the sonic speed barrier for commer-
cial aircraft, which echoed the results of the Cur-
tis Study that I mentioned earlier.
Finally, in connection with NATO-related
work, I was asked in 1982 and 1983, respec-
tively, to give the keynote addresses at a DRG
Symposium on Operations Research and at the
25th Anniversary celebration of TTCP (the Tech-
nical Cooperation Program, which included
U.S., U.K., Australia, New Zealand.). In both
cases, using examples appropriate to each occa-
sion, I stressed the issues of why implementa-
tion of good technological ideas and programs
always takes longer and costs more than origi-
nally estimated and promised.
The reasons were the unknown-unknowns,
‘‘unk-unks,’’ that show up as you go from con-
cept to concrete system, especially in system in-
tegration, where the parts probably have never
been joined together and you run into all kinds
of compatibility problems and second-order ef-
fects. And there are always institutional con-
straints that are rarely accounted for in the
cost and schedule projections: where the budget
will be, because that’s a political decision; and
the conservatism of the military, which in many
cases is justified because they have to win wars
and especially if you consider that you’re going
to be on the defensive, they want the tried and
true, not the untested and uncertain. There
was also legislative competition in the budget
for other things, and you would never know
how that would turn out. You could lay all this
out and show why everything took longer than
you wanted, cost more than you wanted, and
sometimes didn’t get implemented.
That NATO-related work was one whole
area of my non-IDA endeavor. In the late
1980s, I was asked to be on the Strategic Defense
Initiative (SDI) Scientific Advisory Panel –I don’t
remember the circumstances that led to that in-
vitation, but it emerged from my being VP of
IDA, and it emerged from one of the Beltway
think tanks that was helping the SDI office with
technical analyses. Basically, the SDI project
leaders would brief the panel on ideas and prog-
ress, and we would comment. They could use
the advice, or not, as is always the case in such
things. One idea that was floated, called for put-
ting hundreds (as I remember it) of guided in-
terceptor warhead stages in an orbital belt
around the earth, to be operated in conjunction
with a satellite launch warning system. Then the
appropriate interceptor in the belt could be
called down to intercept the launch at boost
phase. The issues, of course, were, first, that it
would be difficult to exercise command and
control over the entire system, and worse, some-
one else might capture it and bring the intercep-
tors onto friendly targets from orbit, and then
what would we do? At any rate, there was
a lot of argument about that, and thank good-
ness, as far as I know the idea was abandoned.
Overall, my recollection is that in the offense-
defense equation the problem of decoys was
the driving issue. Whatever scheme anyone
thought about to pick the warheads out from
a cloud of warheads and decoys, the offense
could always find a way around it. I think that
remains a critical issue, and when I heard the
Bush administration was going to deploy the
system I wondered whether the issue had been
resolved. From reading Aviation Week, which is
my only source on the SDI, I think not yet. So,
why do we deploy? Well, I’m not in ‘‘the sys-
tem’’ any more, so I can only wonder.
That lasted only a couple of years, right
across the boundary between when I retired
from the vice presidency and went part time.
Another area I got involved in, and this one
has lasted over the long term, was that in 1982,
Eb Rechtin invited me to join the Naval Studies
Board (NSB) of the National Academy of Sci-
ences. He was then Chairman of the NSB. As
an aside, Eb, who died a couple of years ago,
was responsible for getting me involved in the
two fascinating long-term extracurricular activ-
ities that most enabled me to continue my
professional contributions along with the man-
agement activities I had undertaken at IDA.
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I’m still affiliated with the NSB, but on
a much-reduced scale. Mainly, I now act as in-
ternal reviewer of selected and important panel
reports before they go out to the wolfpack of ex-
ternal reviewers, whose critiques the study
group then has to take account of in order to
get the reports published by the Academy.
(Most of the time, they do make the reports
better.)
From the start, however, I contributed to
many studies as the integrator and overall re-
port writer, as well as making technical contri-
butions in my areas of technical competence.
Many were multi-volume studies, in which case
I would write the summary report, usually
called the ‘‘Overview’’ volume. At this point I
ought to comment that I have never believed it
worth being on a panel unless I could make
a significant contribution. I enjoy writing, and
I can take a broad view of systems, so all that
turned out to be helpful. I enjoyed exercising
those talents, if you want to call them that.
With the NSB work and the IDA work, I had
to drop out of the NATO activities. I had made
my contribution, and in any case the experience
stood me in good stead for future efforts.
Now, a quick summary of a selection from
many projects I worked on with the NSB, not
necessarily in chronological order.
The first study I worked on was right after I
joined, in about 1982 – a study of the future of
naval aviation. We decided, in what turned
out to be a continuing theme, that the future of
naval aviation would be determined by infor-
mation technology, including target acquisition,
communication, navigation, weapon guidance,
rather than by aeronautical advances, although
the latter would be helpful (stealth technology
hadn’t yet come to the fore, but clearly, that
would have been an exception – if we could talk
about it at that time.) So for me, this reinforced
the conclusions reached in the NATO work.
But the reader shouldn’t draw the conclu-
sion that I, alone, was responsible for those
results. This was the considered opinion of
a group of key people who were expert in all
the areas. For example, the study was chaired
by Bob Frosch, who had been Assistant Secre-
tary of the Navy for R&D. And it included Ivan
Getting, who had been the President of Aero-
space Corporation and was famous for invent-
ing the first radar-controlled naval antiaircraft
gun during World War II, and many others of
that caliber. I was reflecting their results, and I
agreed with them and found them interesting.
And I mustn’t fail to mention Lee Hunt,
who was the Director of the NSB at the time.
Lee helped the studies happen by assembling
the distinguished participants, working out
the task statements, managing the budget, and
liaising with the Navy in many ways. In es-
sence, as the National Academies’ Board Direc-
tor via the National Research Council (NRC),
Lee was the impresario who kept the program
running. The Board Chairman, usually but not
necessarily a member of the National Acade-
mies, presided over the meetings, of course,
and was generally responsible for overseeing
the quality of the technical outputs and reports
of the Board panels and studies, in accordance
with the Academies’ review procedures and
standards. In simple terms to explain a compli-
cated management system, Lee was the NRC’s
internal manager and the Chairman was the
manager of the activities of the outside experts
drawn from Industry and Academia.
Lee and I are still fast friends. [Sadly, as I
review the final draft of this history in mid-
October, 2009, I must report that Lee died of
complications from diabetes just a few days
ago – a great loss to the country and to his many
friends and of course, his family.]
BOB SHELDON: How many people
served on the NSB?
SEYMOUR DEITCHMAN: The NSB was
usually about 30 people and still is. According
to the National Academy of Sciences’ rules,
members are supposed to serve no more than
two 3-year terms, but in a few cases the Board
has found ways to keep some of us associated
with it in various capacities for longer times.
For example, I’m now called a senior advisor,
and work with the Board as an unpaid consul-
tant. They keep my clearance and invite me to
their meetings, which I appreciate very much.
In general, study panels tend to draw in addi-
tional qualified people from the outside, and,
as I’ll note in a moment, can become as large
as 100 or so people.
We did two studies, ten years apart, of
where the Navy would be going in the future
(more accurately, where technology would take
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the Navy in the future). The first was called
Navy 21, and that was done in the mid-1980s.
The next one was TFNF, Technology for Future
Naval Forces, and that was in the mid-1990s.
These were very large studies, on the order of
100 people in each. The TFNF study led to
a nine-volume report, and I wrote the Overview
volume summing up the results of all the sepa-
rate studies, of air warfare, surface warfare,
undersea warfare, information warfare and
command and control (actually, command, con-
trol, communication, computers, intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance [C4ISR]). And,
there was a volume on modeling.
In the first study, we anticipated the impor-
tance of information technology, target acquisi-
tion, and also undersea warfare, and steps that
have to be taken to mitigate the vulnerability
of carriers. Early-on at the beginning of this nar-
rative I mentioned the RASCAL missile that I
had worked on at Bell Aircraft that showed
up, at least in performance, as the Soviet AS4.
This could easily home in on that great corner
reflector that was the island on the deck of the
carrier. That was a continuing problem we had
to deal with in the study.
In the second study we looked at the possi-
bility of using tactical ballistic missiles in place
of ship-borne artillery, and thought that they
could be made more cost-effective with the ver-
tical launch bay that was now being installed on
ships to launch anti-aircraft missiles. But the
Navy was hooked on the Extended Range
Guided Missile (ERGM), which was in work
and intended to be fired from the guns. When
we looked at the magazine size and the rates
of fire of the two modes, we found the vertical
launch bay with ballistic missiles would be far
more cost effective, but we could never per-
suade the Navy of that.
In another interesting exchange, we said the
Navy should have a high-altitude, long-endur-
ance aircraft that could orbit over the fleet so
that the fleet (or, more accurately, a task group)
would have the analog of a continuously avail-
able observation satellite and communication
satellite. One of the carrier admirals, when we
briefed that, said, ‘‘That’s never going to hap-
pen, because a system like that would have to
be joint system and the Navy won’t be able to
own it to control it, so we don’t want it.’’ But
now they’re working on integrating Global
Hawk into the fleet.
Admiral Pilling, who was then the Vice
Chief of Naval Operations (VCNO), said, after
we briefed him on TFNF, ‘‘You’ve showed the
Navy its future,’’ which we took as a great com-
pliment.
There was a big issue in both studies about
modeling and simulation. A modeler by the
name of Tim Horrigan had promulgated what
he called configural theory. His main point
was that in running models, and particularly
naval mine warfare models, the models weren’t
designed to remove the ships and the mines that
were sunk or exploded, respectively, from the
sequential event cycles in the models. Thus the
results weren’t an accurate representation of
the true outcome of such an exchange. That
had been a huge fight in the Navy for many
years. So, modeling at many command levels
from the narrow tactical ones through the major
force-on-force models became one volume of
the report. We thought we’d put it to bed, but
in talking with friends, I hear that it’s still being
argued.
We did a study called Carrier 21, looking at
future aircraft carriers and where technology
would take carrier design, and concluded that
the best course for the Navy would be to stay
with the Nimitz Class carriers. That was not
popular with many members of the panel,
who wanted something big, new, and different.
But we found that they wanted something big,
new, and different because aircraft were proj-
ected to grow in size. That never happened.
The proposed A-12 attack aircraft, which was
the driver, was cancelled because it was over-
ambitious in design and therefore overly costly.
It turned out also that the dry-docks on both
coasts could only take a Nimitz Class carrier
as their maximum size vessel for construction
or overhaul. If there were a bigger carrier, the
whole infrastructure that deals with the carriers
would have to be rebuilt.
Edward Teller had planted the idea with
Congress of creating a floating island built on
the same technology, with vertical spar buoys,
that oil platforms are based on. The island
would be built in sections that would be hooked
together, and the Navy would float this island at
a few knots to every place where a base was
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needed, like the Arabian Sea, where you didn’t
want to put an airbase on land for fear of violat-
ing sovereignty. We put that idea to rest by
showing how much it would truly cost, and
how difficult it would be to operate, and how
putting the sections together and trying to float
them around the world would be rather more
than anybody understood how to do at the time.
It would be just as vulnerable to attack as any
land base, and so would need the same elabo-
rate defenses that the land base would need –
that hadn’t been accounted for in the original
cost estimates, designed to sell the idea.
BOB SHELDON: Is that similar to the cur-
rent sea-basing concept?
SEYMOUR DEITCHMAN: No. That’s dif-
ferent. I’m going to get to that. But first, I’ll note,
we did a command and control study that basi-
cally extended our appreciation of the impor-
tance of space systems. In fact, I should say
that Ivan Getting headed a space panel as
a standing sub-panel of the NSB, and that panel
made many useful contributions in alerting the
Navy to the importance of space systems for the
Navy and urging them to exercise their repre-
sentation on the Air Force planning committees.
The Air Force has been the lead service for DoD
space systems.
I also was vice chair of a mine warfare
study, which was the third in a series that the
NSB had carried out, not counting the mine
warfare contribution of the undersea warfare
sub-panel of the TFNF study. There were many
warnings to the Navy about the potential for
mine warfare to put the Navy out of business
in critical theaters of warfare. In fact, we showed
that during World War II, U.S. mining of Japan’s
Inland Seas was on the verge of putting the Jap-
anese out of business even before the atomic
bomb was dropped on them. We found signifi-
cant gaps in the Navy’s mine warfare programs,
on the offensive (mining) and defensive (mine
sweeping) sides. We recommended ways to fill
those gaps which would have been costly and
which would have required more specialization
in the field than the Navy has been comfortable
with.
But my observation is– and it’s my purely
personal interpretation of their behavior – that,
at least today, the Navy views mine warfare as
passive and defensive, and therefore, not in
keeping with the ethos of offensive warfare. It
could be a problem for us, because instead of
specialized mine warfare systems, the Navy is
planning a defensive mine warfare module for
the new littoral combat ship, in addition to some
helicopter-based anti-mine systems currently in
inventory or in work. But we could face serious
mine warfare threats from the outside. For ex-
ample, the Iranians have threatened to mine
the Straits of Hormuz. Under fire, it would be
very difficult to clear those mines. And it’s pos-
sible that someone like Al Qaeda could arrange
for a mine or two to be dropped in, for example,
New York harbor. Imagine the havoc that would
cause.
Then, we worked on a regional conflict
study that dealt mainly with the Marines.
Again, it dealt with precision weaponry and
precision engagement. Those were recurring
themes. But we also stressed the importance of
combat in built-up areas. This was about the
time of the Black Panthers. You couldn’t use
the term ‘‘urban warfare’’ because it sounded
like you were going to be fighting the Black Pan-
thers. So I invented the term – I’m going to take
credit for that one –of ‘‘combat in built-up
areas.’’ And I note that that has taken hold in
all the Services. I’ve seen it very recently in Ma-
rine technical manuals.
General Krulak, who was then Comman-
dant of the Marine Corps, read our report on
this study– (there were many chapters), and
said, ‘‘The only important chapter worth read-
ing here is the one on fighting in built-up areas.’’
That’s the Marine orientation, and we’ve seen
that in Baghdad, among other places.
I also worked – in the late-1990s – on a study
of experimentation for the Navy, in which we
reinforced the idea that was growing in the
DoD, of ‘‘spiral development.’’ You do some de-
velopment on a system; you put it in the field
and observe how it works; then you develop
further and you keep spiraling up to an ad-
vanced system. We showed the Navy how to in-
tegrate experimentation into the spirals so they
could determine where to go with the next turn
of the spiral.
Another study was Post-Cold War Conflict
Deterrence, which the Navy asked for because
they were thinking about the future roles
of the SSBN (Strategic Submarine Ballistic
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Nuclear) force after the Cold War ended. This
was done in the mid-1990s. I took the responsi-
bility for asking General Goodpaster, who was
then Chairman of the Atlantic Council, whether
he would chair that study, and he agreed and
asked me to be his deputy on the study. Among
others, we had many of the people on the panel
who had crafted the Cold War deterrence theory
and policy, like Tom Schelling, Wolfgang Panof-
sky, Paul Nitze, Dick Garwin, Glenn Kent, and
Paul Wolfowitz (who later became DepSecDef).
Among other things, we propounded the idea
that nuclear weapons are a different order of
magnitude of weapon from other weapons of
mass destruction, because unlike the others,
say, chemical or biological, they deliver instant
destructive power and are much harder to
counter because the time to do so is expected
to be so short.
The study concluded that nukes would be
useful only to deter the use of nukes by others,
so that we could reduce our nuclear arsenal
significantly. Wolfowitz, who had a hand in un-
dertaking the Iraq War and subsequently in ex-
pressing concern over Iran and the North Korean
nuclear programs, was present. During his term
in office none of his actions reflected anything
he might have taken away from the study. Sub-
sequently, we – that is, the country – also seem to
have forgotten the deterrence idea completely. I
want to come back to that afterwards.
Then in later studies, I backed off from be-
ing the chief integrator. I got to the point where
I said to myself, ‘‘Been there, done that,’’ be-
cause that integration involves a tremendous
amount of argument with people on the panel
who have their own ideas about what should
be said and how you should say it. After twenty
or so years of that kind of negotiation it begins to
wear, and I think you lose your effectiveness. I
decided I didn’t want to do that any more.
I worked on a brief study the Board did of
sea-basing, and helped to write that report.
The idea was that if we could base a land and
air combat force at sea we wouldn’t have to de-
pend on foreign bases, and all the issues of sov-
ereignty and alliance influence on how we use
the base. The Navy hoped to be able to base
a whole expeditionary force at sea. Well, it
turned out not to be that easy. They would need
a new kind of ship, which would look like an
aircraft carrier, but no island on the deck be-
cause you would have to land an aircraft about
the size of a C-130J to go to shore with air cargo.
And underneath that flight deck, it would look
like a conventional commercial warehouse
where you could pull out containers from wher-
ever they happen to be with the materiel you
needed next, and run them up to the deck and
get them on the airplanes. It was a whole new
kind of ship which would be quite expensive.
Then there was the issue of offloading ex-
tremely heavy cargo like tanks and trucks that
would overload an air delivery system, onto
lighters at sea, where there would likely be
a practical limit of being able to do it in sea state
3 (waves 2-5 feet). And, it might involve
enforced landing against opposition, and then
having to defend the landing area as a base
ashore, anyway.
We calculated that at best, with the limita-
tions on sea-basing that our study brought out,
the Navy might be able to support a brigade
on shore, so they could use sea-basing if they
could win the war with a brigade. Maybe we
could win some wars with only a brigade. It de-
pends on how fast the country can react to
a building situation.
The NSB also worked on a study of net-
work-centric warfare, to which I contributed pe-
ripherally, where the idea that it’s not the
weapons and platforms that should be the cen-
ter of attention, but it’s the whole combat net-
work including C4ISR, logistics, and all the
other activities that go into a military campaign,
and the weapons and platforms are just part of
the network. That concept was proposed by
Vice Admiral Art Cebrowski, who died just
a few years ago, and it has taken hold strongly
in the whole Defense establishment.
BOB SHELDON: Let me back up to that
sea-basing study. Do you recall the important
variables you worked on in this sea-basing
study and its effectiveness?
SEYMOUR DEITCHMAN: Yes. We looked
at the various cargo needs, the largest being
Class 3 (fuel) and Class 5 (weapons and ammu-
nition); tonnages to support various size forces
in different kinds of combat; necessary delivery
rates; sizes of containers (the ones we looked at
would be smaller than a standard commercial
shipping container – 8 by 8 by 20 feet, if I recall);
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speeds of ship movement; numbers of ships in
the supply train; and aircraft and ship designs.
It was a very thorough review, even though it
was done in a three-day workshop. The people
on the Panel were very knowledgeable, and the
Navy and Marines were very helpful in provid-
ing the necessary data.
BOB SHELDON: What year were you
working on that sea-basing study?
SEYMOUR DEITCHMAN: The report was
published in 2005, so the work was probably
done in 2004.
That was the last study I worked on for-
mally. Now, as I indicated earlier, I’m in the
mode of being an internal reviewer. There were
a couple of reports worth mentioning. I’m not
sure whether they’ve been published in final
form yet. One was on the Navy’s role in the
Global War on Terror, and the other is what Ad-
miral Mullen, when he was CNO, initially
called the Thousand-Ship Navy, but which
came to be called Maritime Security Partner-
ships. That dealt with how nations could get to-
gether to deal with things like piracy in the
Straits of Malacca or, for example, that we have
been seeing lately in the Gulf of Aden off the
coast of Somalia.
Now let me backtrack to the period 1988 to
1996 and describe some of the things I did at
IDA after retiring from the vice presidency
and going part-time. There were two ongoing
DSB studies being supported by IDA that I
had a chance to make some contributions to.
One, chaired by Mal Currie, who had been
DDR&E, was on the possibilities for economic
and technical cooperation between the U.S.
and other Pacific Rim nations. The issue was
how we could cooperate in advancing technol-
ogy without giving away our technological ad-
vantages. I don’t remember a lot about the
study, except that a key question, as an example,
was the assistance we would give to the Japa-
nese in developing their new fighter, which is
now their standard fighter and looks much
like an F-16. The issue at the time was what
the Panel thought the U.S. could get in return
for helping Japan develop that fighter. We
thought they were ahead of us in the technology
of large-scale composite structures and we
could gain knowledge in that area, but it turned
out subsequently that they weren’t that far
ahead of us. But that was the exchange that
was finally agreed.
The other DSB study to which I contributed
had to do with assured access to space. My
role in it is hazy in my memory; mainly, Bob
Hermann, the chairman, had hoped I could con-
tribute to it the way I had contributed to the
NSB studies when he was NSB chairman. That
turned out to be not so easy in the very different
DSB environment, since the DSB members
essentially like to do their own writing; they
prepare the summer study briefings for the
SecDef themselves, and then the staff in the
Pentagon writes the report afterwards.
But that study primed me for the NASA
study I’m about to describe. A task came in to
IDA from NASA under a more general contract
IDA had with them, on how they could assure
manned access to space within their budget
constraints. It dealt with the costs of a potential
successor to the space shuttle and a new ex-
pendable booster, all in support of the Space
Station that was just getting started. I was asked
to lead that study for IDA.
I learned a lot of things about NASA’s
world, and one of them included how NASA
planned their earth observation systems, which
I found to be quite a revelation, and I still marvel
at it. I don’t know if they still work that way
(from a few hints I’ve had reading Science and
Aviation Week magazines, I think they still
do). Namely, in DoD, if we wanted to build
a system to do something, say to observe what’s
transpiring in the earth environment from
space, we would set out the requirements for
what we want, including the instruments, the
‘‘bird,’’ the launcher, etcetera, and we would
ask people for proposals to meet those require-
ments. NASA didn’t work that way. They
would tell the R&D and academic community,
‘‘We’re going to have an earth observing satel-
lite. Send us your proposals for instruments
you want to put on it and we’ll pick and choose
among those proposals.’’ (Of course, they didn’t
say it quite that way, but that was the sense of
their approach).
BOB SHELDON: That is a different way of
doing business.
SEYMOUR DEITCHMAN: Yes. I had trou-
ble coming to terms with that; I still do because
it says the government can’t plan what it wants
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to do. It depends on what the university and re-
search contractor environment antes up for you.
I don’t think that’s a sensible way to work be-
cause you can’t be sure you’ll be able to get
the job done.
The Challenger disaster happened while we
were working on this project. An interesting
thing we learned along the way was that NASA
could have used kerosene-powered rocket
boosters instead of the solid fuel boosters to
help launch the Shuttle, which would have
avoided the Challenger kind of accident. Kero-
sene rockets actually would have had a higher
specific impulse than the solid fuel boosters
they were using. They didn’t want to do it, as
nearly as we could tell, because the technology
wasn’t advanced enough and so they thought
it wouldn’t look right for a high-tech organiza-
tion like NASA to use such retrograde technol-
ogy. We also learned that the main purpose of
the Space Station, as given by an early 1990s
committee chaired by Norm Augustine, was to
learn how humans could live in space for ex-
tended periods so they could incorporate that
in the planning to go to Mars. That stated pur-
pose of the Space Station appeared to have been
lost when the cost of going to Mars became im-
practical, but the Space Station has continued
and we’ve been trying to find earth-oriented
uses for it ever since.
The main results of our study were that if
NASAwanted to save money on the shuttle pro-
gram, they shouldn’t fly it as much. Much of the
use was to send cargo to the space station, and
they could use unmanned boosters for that.
We also found that the new expendable booster
they wanted to build would not be cost effec-
tive, compared with using an existing booster.
Their main problem was that there was no
way to reduce the cost of a man-rated booster,
if they wanted to fly people up to the Station
as an alternative to using the Shuttle. There
are so many precautions you have to take if
you’re going to carry people, with redundancy,
recovery and rescue preparations, extra check-
outs, and on and on, that there’s just no way
you can work the cost down much below where
it is now. That wasn’t our conclusion; the NASA
people at Cape Canaveral told us that. How-
ever, the Headquarters people resisted all these
conclusions at the time of our study. But in prac-
tice, they’ve been following them. They are re-
ducing the cost of the shuttle by flying it less
and in fact, the main reason it’s being taken
out of service five years earlier than they’ll have
a replacement is budgetary. They need the
money to build the replacement.
The expendable launch vehicle they now
use is an evolved expendable launch vehicle,
not a new one, which we thought would cost
too much. It’s based on the Atlas ICBM. We
had recommended using Titan IV from the
ICBM program, since that part of the program
was being discontinued. Titan IV turned out
not to be quite as good as the Atlas, because it
had some unreliable qualities that would have
been difficult to overcome, although it would
have been more powerful.
They haven’t yet found a good program to
succeed the shuttle because of the cost factors
I’ve noted, and the Ares plus Orion manned
space flight program intended to replace the
Shuttle will bear out what we predicted about
a new program. We did this study which wasn’t
accepted by the sponsor; another instance of
where you can be right but unloved for it.
Another thing I worked on was to see
whether one could quantify the military value
of training. Earlier in this discussion I men-
tioned Jesse Orlansky. That was an area he
was working on, and he asked me to get in-
volved with him. The issue was, ‘‘What mea-
sures of effectiveness (MOEs) could be used
for the purpose?’’ We finally settled on using
warfare models and comparing their results
with the results of actual exercises, at least, up
to Platoon or Company level, for purposes of
calibration and to set the values of the ground
force effectiveness parameters. We got data
from the Army Research Office, who got it from
field training exercises, and compared that with
results from combat models like TACWAR. The
MOEs turned out to be the time and resources it
would take to win a battle and how much troop
training you would have to expend in order to
achieve those results. I still have the reports
we wrote on that topic.
I also contributed to the IDA history of
ARPA/DARPA’s chief technical accomplish-
ments, which was published in 1991. It was
a three-volume study that detailed the history
of most of the successful ARPA and DARPA
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projects from the organization’s inception. My
contribution, in addition to describing a few of
the projects where I was especially knowledge-
able, was to describe the particular management
structure and operational concepts that led to
success. Basically, they were that you had an ur-
gent national problem and you set up an organi-
zation that was free to run with it with very few
of the bureaucratic constraints and delays that
characterize the normal operations of the DoD.
They obviously had to stay within budgetary
constraints and they couldn’t do anything illegal,
but Congress gave them a lot of leeway and let
them run outside the usual service and OSD bu-
reaucratic structure, of having to have a ‘‘require-
ment,’’ having to budget years in advance in
exquisite detail, get a whole string of approvals
up the line – all the things that slow defense ac-
quisition to a crawl. I wrote all that detail into
the final volume of the three-volume report. Ob-
viously, having been in ARPA helped, because I
could bring in a lot of inside understanding of
how the ARPA (now DARPA) system worked.
I look now at other organizations people try
to start that are supposed to be ARPA-like. For
example, one just started in the intelligence
area, and I think there is talk of starting one in
the energy area. I don’t think the conditions ex-
ist to make those organizations as successful as
the original ARPA, but that’s a purely personal
conclusion.
Finally, other work I did outside of IDA af-
ter my final resignation from IDA in 1996. I
joined the Atlantic Council right after I retired
from the VP position, while Andy Goodpaster
was Chair of the Council. It was a great learning
experience in terms of seeing how NATO oper-
ated at the top political and diplomatic levels,
which had been beyond my ken in the Panel 7
work, although I had an inkling of it then.
BOB SHELDON: What is the Atlantic
Council?
SEYMOUR DEITCHMAN: The Atlantic
Council of the United States is a non-profit orga-
nization that was organized, I think, to exchange
ideas about and within the Atlantic Alliance, and
to consider matters that concerned the Atlantic
nations, but it eventually got to be broader than
that and deals with national security issues in
the broadest sense – diplomatic, economic, as
well as military and defense. It’s still functioning.
BOB SHELDON: It includes some of the
NATO countries?
SEYMOUR DEITCHMAN: No, it’s a U.S.
organization that deals with the NATO coun-
tries. It sets up lectures and meetings with dis-
tinguished players in international affairs, and
undertakes related public affairs activities, all
having to do with promoting trans-Atlantic co-
operation. As part of that, in addition to it being
a learning experience for me on how things op-
erated at the political level in NATO, I had
a chance to hear from world leaders. For exam-
ple, General Shalikashvili came in and talked
with the Council before he became Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs, and General Wesley Clark
came in and gave a talk before he became
SACEUR. I had written a book by then called Be-
yond the Thaw –this was in 1990, after the Cold
War ended – that dealt with the issues of where
do we go from here. The book formed the basis
of an ‘‘occasional paper’’ that the Council pub-
lished. That was a big deal, as they sent their pa-
pers to all members of Congress and other high
levels of Government – 3000 copies, I was told.
The paper amounted to an executive summary
of that book. That happened because I had
asked Andy Goodpaster to review the book
and then he asked me to write the Council pa-
per.
As a matter of interest, one of the things that
I was able to show, in connection with discus-
sing the future of the Defense budget – at the
time, about 1991, 1992, after the Cold War had
ended – was that the costs to renew our infra-
structure were going to be astronomical, to the
point where the numbers looked beyond belief.
For example, I estimated it would take on the
order of two trillion dollars to upgrade and
maintain the deteriorating parts of our high-
way infrastructure, including especially all the
bridges in the country. That seemed like an im-
possible amount of money at the time, and yet
we’re seeing numbers like that entering the
budget in all seriousness now.
This might be an appropriate place to inter-
ject another illustrative anecdote about the ge-
nius of Gene Fubini. We had stayed in contact
after I left the Pentagon. I had been meeting
Gene about once a month, at his request, espe-
cially after I became Vice President for Pro-
grams at IDA. We would chat for an hour or
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two about affairs of state, the world, and the
DoD, as well as work going on at IDA. Gene
was retired by then, and I think the contact
helped him feel he was keeping his hand in,
and I certainly got some good advice about
many puzzling matters. I had given him a copy
of Beyond the Thaw, and the next time we met, he
dismissed it, in his typical blunt fashion, with
the comment, ‘‘You don’t know anything about
history.’’ Well, that was a puzzler, because I
fancy myself a history buff and the book is
salted with historical references. I asked him
what that was all about, and he commented that
with Tito gone the next big conflict in Europe
would be about the breakup of Yugoslavia,
and I didn’t even mention that in my book. He
was right, and prescient.
To continue my story, I maintained my affil-
iation with the Atlantic Council sporadically.
Then in 2006 I became involved in a study of
post-conflict reconstruction. The issue, spurred
by the Iraq and Afghanistan experiences, was
how to get a country rebuilt after it has been torn
up by conflict, and how the Alliance can do that.
One of the models of how to do it that resulted
from this study was the Provincial Reconstruc-
tion Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan. One conclu-
sion was it would take a lot more resources
than anybody would bargain for. It involved
thinking about how to provide security; how
to get the local people to do a lot of the work,
rather than our doing it for them – all problems
we’re facing in Iraq and Afghanistan today. It’s
all very difficult to accomplish, and it’s hard for
us not to just take over and say, ‘‘Hey, let me do
it.’’ The Afghan PRTs serve as a good model.
I did some work with the Office of Technol-
ogy Assessment (OTA), which had been set up
during the 1980s to help Congress assess the po-
tential impact of new technologies that looked
like they were going to overwhelm the country,
and how to establish policies to deal with their
effects. There was computing, there were ballis-
tic missiles, there were guided weapons and the
questions were, ‘‘What does all this mean?’’
OTA did many studies in civilian areas as well
as military, undertaking projects at the request
of members of Congress, including the Senate
and the House. To do a study, they would as-
semble a group of experts and provide adminis-
trative and technical support and guidance. I
worked with them on the question of where
TACAIR technology was going and whether
ballistic missiles could take over. And again, in
a theme I didn’t originate but that just keeps
coming up, was the issue of how information
technology is going to drive everything and
how to manage it.
When Newt Gingrich became Speaker of
the House, he abolished OTA; my personal
opinion was he didn’t like the answers that
OTA was giving Congress. The way the OTA
system worked, someone in Congress would
ask a question. Then OTA would gather the ap-
propriate experts, and the experts would get
their thoughts around the problem, arguing
around the table the way advisory panels do,
and then the staff would write a report and
the experts would review it to make sure that
their thoughts were accurately reflected in it.
Newt Gingrich didn’t like some of the results
that were coming out and he said ‘‘I don’t need
these people second-guessing me.’’ He dis-
banded OTA and eliminated the authorization
and appropriation track that had set it up. That
was really too bad; I think an organization like
that could be very helpful to Congress (e.g., on
stem cell research, climate change, and alternate
energy), and I may have seen a press report
lately that there is thought being given to resur-
recting it.
I also did some work with the National De-
fense University (NDU) Institute for National
Strategic Studies (INSS). I helped work on a ma-
jor study called ‘‘Globalization and National Se-
curity.’’ There were inputs from both inside
INSS and many on the outside, including peo-
ple like then Undersecretary of the Navy Jerry
Hultin, Bob Oakley, who had been Ambassador
to Pakistan, and Robin Pirie, who at one point
was the Acting Secretary of the Navy and had
also been a Vice President at IDA. I had helped
recruit Robin to the position of VP Planning and
Evaluation when I was VP Programs, and we’d
become good friends. Another participant I
knew quite well was Paul Davis from Rand,
with whom I had worked extensively on the
NSB. All told there were about 50 people on
the project, and they produced nearly as many
papers, all of which were integrated as chapters
into a two volume work called The Global Cen-
tury. My chapter, based on what I had learned
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working with the NSB, was entitled Military
Power and Maritime Forces, in which I laid
out where I thought the Navy and Marines
would have to develop over the next half-cen-
tury. One of the main issues I foresaw was that
the elaborate Cold War base structure that we
had built would have to shrink, making the
maritime forces all the more important as the
spearhead of American power abroad.
The two-volume set was published in 2001,
edited by Dick Kugler of the INSS and Ellen
Frost, who was then with the Institute of Inter-
national Economics and who had been Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Economic
and Technical Affairs. She had also worked for
the U.S. Trade Representative, so she was very
knowledgeable about many aspects of global-
ization outside the narrow military ones.
It was a very broad ranging couple of vol-
umes that ranged over all the military, economic
and diplomatic matters. (You could probably get
them from INSS.) In my chapter, I reflected some
recurring themes in addition to what I noted be-
fore, that I will get to very shortly. Basically, all
these efforts helped my thinking evolve on mat-
ters that I think apply to defense and national
strategy today, as will appear from here on.
After the NDU work, and with the NSB
work pattern still evolving, in about 2005-2006,
I got involved with Ray Hemann, President of
Advanced Systems Research in Pasadena, on
a task for Andy Marshall. I had met Ray through
the NSB work, and he and Lee Hunt (mentioned
above) invited me to work on the study for
Andy Marshall. What Andy wanted to explore
was the economic exchange between our high
military costs when we go after terrorists – peo-
ple like Al-Qaeda – and the costs to Al-Qaeda
and other terrorists, such as those in Somalia,
of attacking us with terrorist acts, or weapons
like the rockets the Palestinians, Hezbollah, or
similar organizations might use to attack U.S.
and allied forces.
That proved to be a non-problem because
we have to pay for our defense budget and the
forces it buys while the other guys get their
weaponry from the states that support them,
so other than their manpower and support costs
they operate for free. But there would also be
a concern if we became involved with a state
like Iran, whose long-range weaponry consisted
of ballistic missiles. As an MOE, I considered
the cost per person in the armed forces, and I
could compare various countries and non-state
actors that way.
It turns out the U.S. has, by far, the highest
cost per person in the armed forces in the world,
but I could show through many examples that it
was cost-effective to spend that money for what
we have come to call precision engagement. I’ll
note two examples here.
One is the bombing of Dresden in World
War II, compared with bombing of Serbia over
Kosovo. Dresden was destroyed because at that
time we didn’t have precision bombing and
there were manufacturing targets scattered
throughout the city. There was no way you
could be sure of hitting any one of them without
destroying a large part of the city around it. So
we just took out the whole city.
In Serbia, with precision navigation and
weapons, we took out just the targets we
wanted to hit, and the few mistakes, like the
Chinese Embassy, resulted from misidentifica-
tion of the target, not the technology of the
engagement (and incidentally, note the im-
portance of IT (information technology) in
TACAIR, again). Another good comparison
came from a look at the U.S. and the USSR in
Afghanistan. They used essentially World War
II methods to try to take the country. They had
helicopters, but they didn’t have precision en-
gagement in the way we understand it. They
were there nine years and essentially were
driven out. It took us three months and we con-
quered the country. It is true that was helped by
alliances with local tribes, but I think we can be
certain that our demonstrated military capabil-
ity, including our ability to take out targets
with precision without destroying the country,
helped persuaded people that they should be
aligned with us.
That was the kind of analysis that went into
our report. Basically, we told Andy that the com-
parison he was looking for was a false lead, and
that the U.S. approach to warfare was cost-effec-
tive by several measures.
We never heard from him about whether he
found our report on this useful, but I expanded
on the ideas that were in it as to what precision
engagement imposes on the structure of the
armed forces in comparison with the armed
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forces of other nations. Since I still had some
connection with the Atlantic Council, I asked
them whether they would publish it as an ‘‘oc-
casional paper.’’ They agreed, and at the sugges-
tion of the Council’s president, I enlarged the
paper to cover what we’d have to do to better
prepare the armed forces to deal with what
has come to be called asymmetrical warfare –
what happens after we conquer a country’s or-
ganized armed forces, as we saw in Iraq, and
as we’re seeing in a resurgence of internal war-
fare in Afghanistan now. That paper came out in
October, 2004.
Here are some major themes that have
emerged from all this work.
One is the effect of the diffusion of technol-
ogy. IT is becoming global and we have to work
much harder to maintain the U.S. technological
lead. It also constitutes a growing vulnerability.
Our armed forces and our whole society are in-
creasingly dependent on IT. You can expect that
opponents will focus on denying us our ability
to observe, to navigate, to communicate – so
our strength becomes our vulnerability and we
have to look out for that. I don’t know the extent
to which we are.
For example, if a nation hostile to us had
one nuclear weapon and wanted to use it most
effectively, they would explode it at the right al-
titude in space. I don’t know whether we have
built our civilian communications, navigation,
etc., systems to be able to withstand the electro-
magnetic pulse from that explosion.
Another theme relates to why we should use
the military for peacekeeping, nation-building,
and post-conflict reconstruction. That was some-
thing the Bush Administration was very nega-
tive about when they came in, and that left us
less prepared to deal with what we’ve actually
run into. I’m glad to see that the current admin-
istration has turned that around. In my view,
the reason you want to use the military for that
kind of thing is that they’re trained, they’re disci-
plined, they know how to marshal resources in
a hurry and organize the use of those resources.
They can fight if they have to, so they can provide
security at the same time they’re doing the recon-
struction. That can get them started until the ci-
vilian help arrives.
I think our nation paid a very high price for
not going that route in Afghanistan and Iraq.
For example, it took years and many contractors
to rebuild the road from Kandahar to Kabul. I
think that could’ve been done by our SeaBees
or the Army Engineers, in a few months, and
what a difference that would’ve made in getting
the country together. They could have protected
themselves while doing it. Now we have the
Provincial Reconstruction Teams doing that
kind of thing, and while that’s appropriate for
the long run we still have to provide protection
for them, so it uses a lot more resources for the
same task.
Another lesson – our enemies play by dif-
ferent rules designed to counter our chivalry-
based rules. They don’t protect their women
and children. In fact, they put them in the line
of fire so we’ll create civilian casualties and
our media will play that up. They do this delib-
erately so as to create dissent about our prosecu-
tion of a war within our own country. For
reasons like this, we’re not, by nature, attuned
to long wars. Our enemies know that, so they
know that they don’t need to win battles against
us, all they have to do is keep the war going and
we’ll tire of it and want to go home. I came to
that conclusion during the Vietnam War and it
still, to me, seems to be true. You see the signs
of all this when, say, insurgents in Iraq start
shooting at our troops from the middle of
a crowd in order to get us to shoot back, and in-
deed, in the fact that we have to fight insurgen-
cies at all to support our interests overseas. And,
it has become an issue again in the Afghanistan
War, under President Obama. Insurgencies take
a lot of time to resolve.
I want to backtrack a minute to make an-
other note about this. When I talked about going
to the Air University and misusing our air
power because the enemy set up his guns in
the temples and shot at us from there, and we
shot back and thereby created more enemies.
BOB SHELDON: That was Hue City?
SEYMOUR DEITCHMAN: Many places
all over Vietnam. It’s been the same thing in Iraq
and it is now the same thing in Afghanistan.
That’s another lesson. We don’t understand that
we’re fighting an enemy that doesn’t play by the
same rules that we do.
Another theme: We have to work with other
nations but there aren’t any others that spend
the cost per person in the military that we do.
MORS ORAL HISTORY PROJECT . . . MR. SEYMOUR J. DEITCHMAN
Military Operations Research, V15 N2 2010 Page 101
We have unique capabilities and if those capa-
bilities start to spread, that will enhance our vul-
nerabilities, (as I commented earlier). On the
other hand, we hear a lot of talk now about
how building conventional forces is passe´ be-
cause we need to be able to fight asymmetric
warfare, meaning we are fighting against terror-
ists and insurgents. But we need both and that’s
something that’s not commonly recognized, be-
cause if we leave an opening, that’s where our
enemies will come in. We have only to look
way back to the Korean War and note that we
demobilized after World War II and left our-
selves wide open. That’s when the communist
forces moved, and that kind of thing could hap-
pen again. In fact, I could argue that the reason
we are coming to be on good terms with China
is that they have come to the fact that we will
protect Taiwan and we have the capability and
the resolve to do it. As soon as we let that go,
it will become a whole different ballgame.
Finally, I’ve been giving a lot of thought to
deterrence. It seems to be gone from our lexicon
but to me, the essence of deterrence is that the
side that would attack you perceives that in
your counterattack they will lose much more
than they have to gain by the attack itself. As
an example, think about the jihadists. When
our current presidential campaign was just
starting and we had many people tossing their
hats into the ring, Representative Tom Tancredo
from Colorado said, ‘‘Well, if they blow up
a nuke among us, we’ll drop one on Mecca.’’
The jihadists may not care, but the nations har-
boring them would have to think about whether
we might actually do that. If there were a nuke
blown up in the U.S. that killed a few hundred
thousand people, and if it was also decapitating
so that the most responsible elements of our
government might no longer be in charge, then
there would be no telling what we might do. We
would hope the harboring nations would figure
that they’d better restrain the jihadists.
To reinforce that, we have shown in many in-
stances, like Korea, the Gulf War, Afghanistan –
even Pearl Harbor – that attackers mis-estimate
how we’ll come back. Also, when we talk about
it being intolerable for Iran to have a nuclear
weapon I haven’t heard anyone raise the notion
of deterrence. Deterrence worked perfectly well
between us and the USSR for 40 years or more –
why can’t we do that vis-a`-vis Iran? I remember
reading that Rafsanjani, who had been Presi-
dent of Iran either one or two Presidents before
Ahmadinejad, said, ‘‘If we had a nuclear ex-
change with Israel, then we would be damaged
but Israel would be obliterated.’’ Well, if we put
Israel under our nuclear umbrella, we have
enough under the sea in one of our SSBNs to
obliterate Iran. Why don’t we use that instead
of just saying a nuclear-armed Iran would be
‘‘intolerable.’’ Intolerable means we have to do
something about it right away – do we really
want to go to war with a country the size of
Alaska that has 79 million people, many of
whom are, underneath it all, friendly to the
U.S.?
I’m troubled about the lack of discussion
about deterrence, and I keep writing about that
wherever I can. For example, I had a long letter
in the National Academy of Sciences journal,
Issues in Science and Technology, about this very
thing. Some people fear, and I think Senator
McCain mentioned it during the election cam-
paign, that if we let Iran have a nuclear weapon,
then we’ll have a nuclear arms race in the area.
But when we put Japan under our nuclear um-
brella, Japan didn’t build nuclear weapons.
They know they’re protected. Similarly with,
South Korea – and we have extended the nu-
clear umbrella over countries that have nuclear
weapons. If the argument would be made vis-a`-
vis Israel – they already have weapons, so what
value is our nuclear umbrella? Well, so do
France, so do Britain. But we still extended our
nuclear umbrella over them during the Cold
War. A gap in our ability to do this is, as Larry
Welch has pointed out, that while we and the
Russians each had a pretty good appreciation
of what motivated the other, we don’t know that
much about Iran. In fact the study of post-Cold
War deterrence by the NSB recommended that
the conditions and motivations of new players
in the deterrence game need to be studied. That
was a recommendation to the Navy, but to my
knowledge, no one has followed up on it. This
is now my crusade, if you want to call it that.
We’ve got to start thinking about deterrence in
these new contexts.
Now I’ve reached a close but I can’t end it all
without noting the honor of having won the
MORS Wanner Award in the year 2000. To me
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that was a way of saying ‘‘congratulations on
having made some useful contributions to what
we (the people interested in defending the na-
tion) do.’’
BOB SHELDON: One of the things some of
my mentors have tutored me on is the book
Thinking in Time by Neustadt and May, and I
think you’ve read it. The book is replete with ex-
amples about historical anecdotes being used
poorly to make current-day decisions. Based
on your experience from writing in the Vietnam
era and the insurgency and now applying that
to the current day, how would you say what
you learned back then compares to what we
would apply now – what’s the same and what’s
different?
SEYMOUR DEITCHMAN: Let me first say
what I think is different. The enemies are differ-
ent; they think differently, they operate differ-
ently. The North Vietnamese were trying to
unify the country under their rule; they weren’t
trying to come to the United States and strike us
here. Their activity in the United States was pro-
pagandistic. I would read classified things that
sounded just like what I was reading in the
New York Times about what the North Vietnam-
ese were saying in their anti-U.S. propaganda.
Beyond that, the Vietnamese – or, rather, the
Vietcong - were following the Mao Tse Tung
model of insurgency. Start with subversion,
grow into guerrilla units, and from there into
organized units. The North Vietnamese were al-
ready a full-fledged army, growing out of their
war with the French, and they were helping
the Vietcong and eventually invaded the South
themselves with regular army units.
What I think is the same is that we have
a tendency to underestimate our enemies. Ex-
ample one: In Vietnam, we had all of Bernard
Fall’s books, which were required reading in
the U.S. Army. They told about how difficult
an enemy the North Vietnamese were, and yet
I remembered when we went in there, the feel-
ing was, ‘‘With our technology, we won’t be
caught like the French. We’ll overcome that en-
emy easily with it.’’ It didn’t work. Next exam-
ple: Iraq. We went in there thinking, ‘‘These
people are going to be friendly, they’ll welcome
us.’’ At least that’s what we were told. We didn’t
recognize the internal schisms between Sunni
and Shia. We did understand a little bit about
the Kurds but thought that one would be
under control because we had a sub rosa
friendly relationship with them even during
Saddam’s time. In Afghanistan, we created our
own diversion by invading Iraq, thinking the
job in Afghanistan was finished – we never
thought about how the guys we beat might try
to come back.
Again, we underestimated the opposition.
We’re underestimating the opposition now, I
think, vis-a`-vis Al Qaeda. I don’t know what’s
happening in the classified world, because I’ve
had no briefings on that; but I think, at least
from all the public statements that came up in
the presidential debates and since, in some
quarters the thought is, well they’re essentially
beaten, they’re falling apart. I think we’re get-
ting into a much more dangerous situation be-
cause there’s going to be a lot more freelancing
among the jihadists, inspired by Al Qaeda in
the background. Just listen to Zawahiri’s occa-
sional rants. We don’t know where they might
strike next. There’s a book that I have read,
called Lightning Out of Lebanon, which is about
Hezbollah penetrating the United States, mainly
for fundraising purposes. It describes how a
Hezbollah cell was broken up by the FBI in
Charlotte, North Carolina. That is mainly what
the book is about, but it describes activity in
other areas. When you read that book, you real-
ize in spite of all the constraints, how easy it is to
penetrate this country. So again, I think we’re in
the business of underestimating our opposition
and that seems to be a U.S. characteristic.
BOB SHELDON: In Vietnam, you were
working with a team of social scientists. Now
several years later, we’re trying to use social sci-
entists again for the irregular warfare fight.
What’s the same and what’s different?
SEYMOUR DEITCHMAN: What’s the
same is, I think, the sensitivity of the subject.
As soon as a social scientist breaks out and does
something that the media might think is news-
worthy, that would make a news article. The
media will jump on it, mainly as something to
make fun of or to be snide about. Either vis-a`-
vis the government, because why didn’t you un-
derstand what this guy is saying, or vis-a`-vis the
social scientist because why did you probe into
that sensitive area? The sensitivity of what so-
cial scientists might find and how that would
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strike the media, and how that might backfire
on policy, I think, is much the same.
What’s different is that there’s more re-
cognition on the Hill that we need that kind of
work. In fact, when I read in Science Magazine
that the DoD is going to start what is now
called the Minerva enterprise, I wrote to the
man who was named as the person responsible
for it in OSD and told him that we had a similar
experience and mentioned my book. We’ve
had several exchanges, including with Yuna
here, and with Pauline Kusiak, who I think is
now the Program Manager on that. One of the
people that I talked with, who learned about
my recent activities and expressed an interest,
is Representative Ike Skelton’s Staff Chief. We
had lunch together and he indicated his boss
approved of the effort. That’s totally different
because at the time of Vietnam, the Congressio-
nal staff was totally hostile to the whole notion
of the DoD using social scientists to study what
they viewed as things within the State Depart-
ment’s domain. Finally, I’ve learned since that
Minerva was actually started by Secretary of
Defense Gates. It’s not just ‘‘me’’ being tolerated
in an initiative, as back in the Vietnam Project
Camelot days; now it’s policy at the highest
levels.
Another thing that I think helped Project
Minerva get started without negative fanfare is
that there was a presidential election going on
at the time and the media were focused on that
so they weren’t looking for malfeasance on the
part of social scientists. That’s just an accident
of timing, which has been very favorable. I hope
it’ll do some good.
When they start getting into subjects that
are sensitive, that could get to be a whole differ-
ent thing. I’m trying to think of an example that
could rouse people up. Suppose, as a hypotheti-
cal example, that it was found out that DoD-
supported social scientists were studying Tai-
wan, in Taiwan, to find out under what circum-
stances Taiwan would be willing to be absorbed
by Mainland China, and that became public.
That would raise a storm. The situation, to me,
is fragile, even with all the positive aspects I out-
lined earlier. Project Camelot, the effort started
back in the Vietnam days, blew up when social
scientists, not appreciating the sensitivity, broke
out of the bureaucratic constraints I had tried to
impose and went public. That could happen
again on sensitive subjects.
BOB SHELDON: There’s often tension be-
tween OR analysts who want to quantify every-
thing in nice, simple terms and social scientists
who generally use qualitative methods. Based
on your experience with these issues, what kind
of advice would you give?
SEYMOUR DEITCHMAN: Use the simple
OR terms but allow the social scientists to hedge
them around with conditions and references
to circumstances and possibilities where they
might or might not apply. In other words, you
have an MOE but then you say, well, this applies
in these circumstances but not necessarily in
those, and so forth, and that’s what the social
scientists add.
I had an exchange like that with my friend,
Jesse Orlansky, whom I described earlier in this
oral history. I had quoted Lord Kelvin in one of
my books – in fact it was the book on Camelot in
which Lord Kelvin said, in paraphrase, ‘‘When
you can express something mathematically,
then you begin to understand it. And when
you can measure it, you can then understand
it.’’ And Jesse, the psychologist said, ‘‘That’s
a bunch of nonsense.’’ He didn’t agree with that
at all because he felt you couldn’t describe the
complexities of human behavior in such terms.
My way through this is, yes let the OR people
do their thing, and the social scientists can help
them understand the implications of what
they’re doing in human terms. The OR people
express the MOE and then the social scientists
put all the caveats around it.
BOB SHELDON: What has been your in-
volvement with MORS over the years?
SEYMOUR DEITCHMAN: Sporadic. I
came to some of the symposia, and was a mem-
ber on and off. I received the Phalanx and
enjoyed reading it, then had a lot of other things
to do and I didn’t attend as often.
YUNAWONG: I was just curious as to your
thoughts on modeling and simulation in irregu-
lar warfare?
SEYMOUR DEITCHMAN: I had com-
mented earlier that I wrote a paper on ‘‘A Lan-
chester Model of Guerrilla Warfare.’’ I think if
you can do the modeling correctly – and they
have to be stochastic models because the way
guerrillas (and humans in general) operate
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everything is going to be statistical – the work
ought to be done, for two reasons. One is, when -
and if - you finally get a model, it’s going to
help. But the key point is, in trying to build
the model you’ll learn a hell of a lot about both
your opponent and yourself. So by all means, I
think that should be done. Irregular warfare is
broader than guerrilla war. Guerrillas in warfare
are in many ways an organized military unit, if
you will, in a place. They operate under cover
and they operate clandestinely and so on. But ir-
regular warfare is broader. It also includes the
jihadists and international terrorism and some
of those kinds of things. All this is in my lexicon;
I don’t know what the official definitions are.
YUNA WONG: Because you have such ex-
tensive experience in so many past national se-
curity challenges, what should MORS be
trying to do going ahead?
SEYMOUR DEITCHMAN: I think a useful
thing that can be done in today’s environment
would be to spread the notion that you raised
earlier, that you can do modeling – that there
is value in the process, and I would try to get
military people to understand that. When peo-
ple think about models they usually think about
simple exchanges, which don’t work very well
in the kinds of warfare we face now. We need
to get people to think about extremely complex
models that are statistically based. We can vary
parameters statistically, so that we can learn, or
characterize, the nature of the different kinds of
warfare that we’re talking about now. MORS
should be very well placed to encourage that.
I had a hint that one of the candidates for
President or Vice President early on – it might
have been Wesley Clark – said something like,
‘‘Well, we’ve run our models and this is the
way we come out of it.’’ I don’t know what
models they’re talking about. If it’s a simulation
model like TACWAR, it’s useless vis-a`-vis the
kinds of warfare that we seem to be having to
fight today. That might be one of the most im-
portant areas to work in.
Another is to learn about dual purpose
armed forces. You have to have the people
trained for combat against organized armed
forces because those are all over the world and
we don’t know where or how we’re going to
get involved. Then how do you use those people
to do the work of what’s now called asymmetric
warfare? I don’t like that term, by the way, and
I’ll come back as to why. How do you get them
to do the work of asymmetric warfare, which in-
volves everything from local business econom-
ics all the way to fighting guerrillas and just
maintaining law and order in a community.
All that will come in play. I don’t think we fully
understand how to use our military in that con-
text and still have them be a military that can
fight more conventional wars that might come
up again.
Why don’t I like the term, ‘‘asymmetric
warfare?’’ Let’s go back to the Cold War. We
were a strong naval power, and when John
Lehman came in as Secretary of the Navy he came
up with a Maritime Strategy that said we’re go-
ing to send five carriers into the Norwegian Sea
and bomb the hell out of the Soviet Union, and
he turned our Navy in that direction. How did
the Soviets counter that? With submarines and
aviation. That’s asymmetric warfare and the
term asymmetric warfare applies to a lot of
things. When it’s applied to the warfare be-
tween us and the jihadists, that masks the possi-
bility that that’s not the only asymmetric
warfare. I would call warfare between us and
the jihadists anti-jihadist warfare and that’s ex-
plicitly descriptive.
But to continue, I think MORS can do much
to raise the national consciousness about deter-
rence and its value. My personal opinion is that
if Iran wants to make nuclear weapons, we’ll
never stop them. They know how to design
the weapon now. They are gathering the mate-
rial and even if we bomb the hell out of their
centrifuges, they’ll find a way to make a weapon
anyway. They’ll get the material from North
Korea, if necessary. But deterrence has to work
and I think the U.S. has forgotten the language
of deterrence and MORS can really help bring
that back. You could even have a MORS session
about deterrence, to get people thinking about
it. Assume countries like Iran, North Korea,
and others have nuclear weapons, or Pakistan
turns hostile and they’ve got nuclear weapons
already. How do you deter them? We’ve just
given up thinking about it.
BOB SHELDON: At Ft. Leavenworth, they
have what’s called Human Terrain Teams - cul-
tural anthropologists. Any comments on that
from your perspective?
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SEYMOUR DEITCHMAN: I don’t know
enough about what they’re doing. But I in-
stantly understood what they meant with the
term human terrain. We deal with physical ter-
rain and now thinking about the ‘‘human ter-
rain’’ is, to me, a step very much in the right
direction. It might even lead us not to underes-
timate our opposition, for a change.
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